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This thesis examines the requirements for a world without nuclear weapons and 
the steps required for further reductions. It situates nuclear weapons within other 
weapons of mass destructions and outlines their dangers. Through the examples of the 
People’s Republic of China, France, and the United States, the thesis explores the 
rationale behind state acquisition of nuclear weapons. The thesis combines the idealistic 
commitment of nuclear abolition movements with the national security realities of 
nuclear weapons states. It outlines the steps necessary for achieving a world without 
nuclear weapons through multiple stages, each with specific goals that have to be met 
before embarking on the next stage. The thesis posits that any meaningful exploration of 
a world without nuclear weapons can only be achieved through gradual generational 
change. Finally, it shows how a world without nuclear weapons would look like and the 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction: The World of Nuclear Weapons 
 
"A world free of nuclear weapons would be a global public good of the highest order." 1  
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
 
There is no quick and easy way of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.  
Despite what some opponents of nuclear weapons may say, a premature drawdown 
process poses greater dangers than the status quo.  Yet, nuclear weapons pose a danger to 
society, inasmuch as global thermonuclear war, althoug  low in probability, would be 
highly cataclysmic.  With the changes that conflict has undergone in the last twenty 
years, the concept of a nuclear free world is worth pursuing.  While counter-intuitive and 
ahistorical, because technologies of war have only been deemed inhumane and 
successfully avowed in the last one hundred years, the concept of a world free of nuclear 
weapons is plausible. Decaying nuclear weapons stockpiles make the discussion relevant 
and pertinent.  
There have been major shifts caused by globalization in the international security 
environment.  The arms control regime and the treaties of the late 20th century best 
                                                   





exemplify how the end of World War II has shaped the international security 
environment.  Michael O’Hanlon states, “During the Cold War and its immediate 
aftermath, the nuclear superpowers considered it unrealistic to do much more than try to 
gradually reduce nuclear arsenals from their astronomical sizes.”2  Recently, arms control 
has achieved considerably more.  In the Modern Era, arms control, as part of the 
normative discussion, has contributed meaningfully to the international security 
environment with multiple treaties including the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 
the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons.  These treaties limited the size and destructive capability of 
states.  Therefore, the concept of a nuclear weapons free world, earlier subjugated to the 
realm of a small fringe group of society, now has merit. 
The strategy presented here attempts to reconcile the symbolic strength of the 
nuclear abolitionist movement with the cold realities of the Nuclear Age.  The thesis 
attempts to identify requirements necessary on the road to zero, then outline a 
generational approach to the stages required for achieving a world without nuclear 
weapons. Before the exploration of the road to zero, the international community must 
first meet four prerequisites.  First, the international community has to disassociate 
Nuclear Weapons from other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), through focusing on 
the unique qualities, namely their cataclysmic destructive power and inherent deterrent 
capability.  Second, through the detailed exploratin of the “No First Use policy” through 
the case of the People’s Republic of China, it has to recast the idea that nuclear weapons 
                                                   





only counter other nuclear forces.  Because of this recasting, strategic efficiency and 
effective allocation of resources will enter into the calculation.  Until this is not a reality, 
the nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence realities of nuclear weapons states make 
any major breakthrough unrealistic.  Third, the inter ational community has to remove 
the gain of prestige associated with nuclear weapons and create a pariah status for nations 
who either pursue such weapons, or are in non-compliance with the road to zero.  French 
nuclear history, combined with adequate internationl pressure, shows that this is feasible 
given an alternative direction for the state to channel their prestige ambitions.  Finally, for 
the process to be credible there has to be an effective international regime with 
verification technology, implementation resources, and authority to deal with non-
compliance, along with a leader who is willing to commit enough resources to make this 
a reality: the United States.  
Once these requirements are met, the road to zero can be meaningfully pursued 
through multiple stages. While the thesis argues that a generation must pass between each 
stage for adoption of the new status quo, if the requir ments for each are met earlier, the 
time between each can be shortened. The first such stage is entitled the Post-Cold War 
Generation. The international security environment is currently in this stage. This stage 
must efficiently deal with the end of the Cold War and get rid of the concept of US-
Russian nuclear supremacy by bringing their nuclear arsenal to roughly one thousand 
each – and thereby demystifying the ‘nuclear superpower’ status of the two. The 
following stage may be called the 1,000ers. This stage focuses on equalizing nuclear 





nuclear weapons stockpiles, can be said to happen at 200 nuclear warheads. Recognition 
of the new status quo will take time. Following thecompletion of this stage and the 
adoption of two hundred as the new nuclear arsenal status quo, The 200 Club can focus 
on bringing this number down even further through effici ncy in strategy. The smaller the 
number of nuclear warheads, the easier it is to maintain supervision and appropriate 
safeguard measures. Also, inasmuch as deterrence works, the cost of it can also be 
‘controlled’. Resources spent on maintaining a larger deterrent force than needed are 
resources wasted – alternate methods would increase strat gic efficiency for states to 
fulfill their other obligations towards their population. The penultimate stage can be 
labeled as Asymptotic Minimal Deterrence. This interim stage is drawing these 
numbers down even lower, with multi-national talks. Once the number 200 seems as out-
dated and as illogical as 40,000, the nuclear deterrent needed can be further reduced, to 
an even smaller number. The number of nuclear weapons needed is based on future 
alliances and geo-strategic considerations, but while converging to zero, does not actually 
achieve it. The final, end-stage is the generation of the Trust Fund Kids. This stage is 
characterized by final de-operationalization of nuclear weapons. This is the crucial next 
step, when the “200” society already ascribing to mini al nuclear deterrence realizes that 
the possibility of nuclear war can be further reduced by increasing the time it takes for 
states to potentially use these weapons. Populations w uld perceive themselves safer 
knowing that it would take a longer designated period of time (perhaps even a week) for 





Each stage is also complemented by steps that have to be taken on the road to 
zero, yet their timing might vary – some may happen co currently at the outset, or be re-
affirmed throughout each stage, or even neglected until the end of specific stages. While 
these steps are incremental, albeit not crucial, to the successful implementation of each 
stage, their effects on the road to zero are paramount. These additional steps, the positive 
effects of smaller nuclear arsenals with regards to securing them from accidents and 
thefts, along with their normative re-distributing as weapons of last resort; the positive 
effect of the reinforced road to zero on proliferation; de-alerting and it’s adjustment of 
conceptual definitions of retaliation; and secure and international systems of verification 










Chapter 2: The Problematic Nature of Nuclear Weapons 
 
Even though the argument persists as to what is conidered a Weapon of Mass 
Destruction, nuclear weapons possess a single unique characteristic that sets them apart 
from the others in a significant manner: their capability as a deterrent. This uniqueness of 
nuclear weapons within the arms control regime needs to be made clear. Combining 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear into one group, CBRN, is artificial. While 
all are technically weapons of mass destruction, their inherent capabilities and intrinsic 
characteristics make them each a unique case. The umbrella term for all three as WMD, 
weapons of mass destruction, is sometime misleading and uninformative especially when 
the differences are considered. The Commission on Conventional Armaments states that:  
“[WMD are] . . . atomic explosive weapons, radio active material weapons, lethal  
chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which 
have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb 
or other weapons mentioned above.”3  
 
This characterization is limiting for strategy and unsustainable. If all weapons of 
mass destruction are unlawful and inhumane, the logical conclusion on the global scale is 
that, following closely in the footsteps of the BWC and the CWC, a Nuclear Weapons 
Convention should be just over the horizon. Yet no such treaty is under serious 
                                                   
3 Commission for Conventional Armaments, UN document S/C.3/32/Rev.1, August 1948, as quoted in 
United Nations, Office of Public Information, The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1965, UN 





consideration. The Biological Weapons Convention, the first multilateral treaty banning 
an entire category of weapons,4 came into effect in 1975,5 and with 165 states as 
signatories, it can be considered a major success. Similarly, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, that entered into force in 1997, has 188 party states and can also be 
considered a major success of the arms control regime. 6 State actors have restrained from 
using these weapons since these treaties. “In contrast to the nuclear efforts of North 
Korea, Iran, and Syria, no states are newly pursuing, or suspected of pursuing, in an overt 
or exposed manner, chemical or biological weapons.”7 
Both from a normative, and a state-level realist argument, these weapons of mass 
destruction are separate entities and have to be treated as such. As Ashton Carter states: 
“The phrase “weapons of mass destruction” . . . is an amorphous one, changing 
meaning according to the whims of the speaker. Raising the specter of WMD is 
more a way by which politicians assign blame or take  stand on seemingly 
objective moral standards than a way by which they assess a particular weapons 
system.”8 
 
                                                   
4 While earlier attempts do exist, for example the Second Lateran Council and its ban on the use of 
crossbows, it was far from multilateral (issued by the Pope of the Roman Catholic Church) and from 
universal (only banned the use against Christian targe s. The ban was also ignored almost completely).  
 
5  “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction”, text from the United Nations Office at Geneva 
website, URL: 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C4048678A93B6934C1257188004848D0/$file/B
WC-text-English.pdf, accessed March 27th, 2012.  
 
6  “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction”, text taken from United Nations Treaty Collection, URL: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-3&chapter=26&lang=en, 
accessed March 28th, 2012.  
 
7 Blunn, Elaine M. (ed) “The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” in Global Strategic 
Assessment 2009. From National Defense University website, URL: 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/02-GSA2009, accessed March 31st, 2012.  
 





He goes on to limit WMD from the traditional triad of nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons to just nuclear and biological.9 Harigel comes at it from a different aspect. He 
states that neither chemical nor biological weapons should be considered as WMD, but 
that conventional ammunitions should, based on the number of casualties they inflict.10 
The problems of consolidation WMD into one category thus continues well into the 21st 
century. The United States Air Force, guardian of the United States nuclear arsenal, is 
currently approaching the problem on multiple tracks. The Air Force Staff is attempting 
to develop alternative definitions of WMD based on projected destructive capabilities.11 
According to Carus, there are problems with this approach: “The authors of that study 
suggest adoption of a quantitative, effects-based definition, but admitted to failure in 
attempting to create such an alternative.12” Similarly, the United States Air Force 
Academy is currently pursuing a course designated Wapons of Mass Effect to both 
broaden and specify the concept.13 Both of these approaches attempt to encompass all 
WMD under a single concept but fall short of achieving a coherent single approach. 
                                                   
9 Ibid.  
 
10 Gert G. Harigel, “Introduction to Chemical and Biological Weapons—Chemical and Biological 
Weapons: Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and Enviro ment,” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2001, URL: www.ceip.org/files/Publications/Harigelreport. asp?p=8&from=pubauthor, accessed 
March 26th, 2012.  
 
11 “Emerging WMD Technologies and the U.S. Air Force,” Air Force Emerging Issues Project, December 
2004.  
 
12 Carus, Seth W. “Defining ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’”, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Occasional Paper, January 2006.  
 






As stated above, in many ways, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons all fall 
under the category of WMDs, but only one serves deterr nce purposes: nuclear. 
Biological weapons and Chemical weapons do not, in the conventional definition of 
deterrence, serve as deterrent weapons. Rather, they are considered purely offensive 
weapons (in perception that is, which is what deterr nce mainly relies on; all of the above 
can be used as defensive traps triggered by invasion). Outlawing offensive weapons, 
given the fact that wars in international normative society are to be defensive, is 
inherently easier to accomplish than outlawing defensive ( with deterrent capabilities) 
weapons. Nuclear weapons are considered by many states “the ultimate guarantor of 
national security.” The major difference is that chemical and biological weapons can 
reliably only be used as coercive weapons, but not as weapons of deterrence. Admittedly, 
a single weaponized virus may cause more psychological damage than a single nuclear 
warhead, yet weaponized strands of such virus have virtually no testing capabilities, thus 
defy the logic of nuclear deterrence. Stable nuclear dy dic relations rely on proof of 
testing, such as US-Soviet relations and India and Pakistan’s recent history.  
Another factor contributing to the deterrent factor of nuclear weapons is the taboo 
on their non-use. As Nina Tannenwald states, the use of nuclear weapons has had a taboo 
on it for the past 70 years.14 The United States had nuclear supremacy past 1945 until the 
Soviets developed sufficiently advanced delivery methods for their own nuclear weapons 
developed in 1949. Yet the US did not use this inherent advantage in any offensive way. 
The destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima did start the taboo. Only acquisition of 
                                                   
14 Tannenwald, Nina. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-use of Nuclear Weapons since 





nuclear weapons is limited by a treaty – the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT 
identifies the Nuclear Weapons States and the non-nuclear weapon states, and, in Articles 
I and II  
( “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive 
the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, 
or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receiv  any assistance in the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”), effectively 
finalizes the nuclear weapons reality. 15 This nuclear grand bargain also has two 
other major parts: first, that those states in posses ion of nuclear weapons work on 
eliminating these (“undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament”), and second, that they share nuclear energy technology with 
signatories. 16 
 
 Alternate uses for nuclear weapons, such as planetary defense, may also warrant 
their retention. As an Air University Space study suggests:  
“Now that it is recognized that collisions with objects larger than a few hundred 
meters in diameter not only can threaten humanity on a global scale but have a 
finite probability of occurring, means for mitigating them seem clearly worth 
investigation. It should also be recognized that the technology required for a 
system to mitigate the most likely of impact scenarios is, with a little concerted 
effort, within humanity's grasp. Such a system could use the latest nuclear 
explosives, space propulsion, guidance, sensing and targeting technologies 
coupled with spacecraft technology.” 17  
 
Thus, the future may require that some supra-nationl governing authority maintain a pre-
approved number of nuclear weapons, accepted even by those most staunchly opposing 
                                                   
15 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, text from the United Nations Review Conference website, URL: 




17 “Preparing for Planetary Defense: Detection and Interception of Asteroids on Collision Course with 
Earth”, Air University Spacecast 2020: Into the Future, URL: 





nuclear weapons. If weapons that are more destructive than nuclear weapons are 
invented, the entire situation shifts dramatically, perhaps to the point of talking about 
nuclear weapons will no longer be relevant. Yet the current security environment still has 
nuclear weapons under a states’ weapons arsenal. Their dangers, outlined below, prove 









Chapter 3: The Dangers of Nuclear Weapons 
  
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  warns of the dangers of nuclear weapons by 
stating that the parties are “Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all 
mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the 
danger of such a war and to take measures to safegurd the security of peoples”  
and commit themselves to global nuclear disarmament to put an end to the risk of nuclear 
war. 18 
Above the benefits of nuclear weapons were examined for those states having 
them. The stable nuclear dyads currently present ar limited in use and even more limited 
by the time frame they apply to. Devin Hagerty posits that “There is no more ironclad 
law in international relations that this, nuclear states do not fight wars with each other.”19 
Whether this axiom is true depends on the observer’s point of view. India and Pakistan 
has had conflict between armed forces after both acquired nuclear weapons.20 Even if one 
accepts Hagerty’s conclusion, the logic of the past need not apply to the future. The most 
vivid example is Kantian economic interdependence theory, which, albeit rational, did 
                                                   
18 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, text from the United Nations Review Conference website, URL: 
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/npttext.shtml, accessed March 25, 2012. 
 
19 Hagerty, Devin. The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 184, in Waltz, Kenneth, and Sagan, 
Scott. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Norton, New York, 2003. 
  





not apply to the start of World War I, where France and Germany were each other largest 
trading partners.  
Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan enter into the debate of whether the increase in 
nuclear weapons will be “better” or “worse” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A 
Debate Renewed.21 While Waltz’ argument that “Many Will Be Better” does have its 
merits, Sagan effectively counters them and outlines why the further spread of nuclear 
weapons will pose dangers instead of achieving the stabilizing effects Waltz outlines. In 
the following, the dangers of nuclear weapons are outlined, in a broad sense. These 
dangers fall into five separate categories: acquisition of nuclear weapons by other state 
actors, acquisition by non-state actors, use of nuclear weapons by actors, use by non-state 
actors, and nuclear accidents. A reconfigured stockpile, with smaller numbers with 
warheads stored separately from delivery vehicles, would decrease the risk associated 
with each of the five categories.  
 
Acquisition by State Actors – Proliferation and Nuclear Tipping Points 
As Campbell and Einhorn point out in their conclusion  for The Nuclear Tipping 
Point, “changes in the international security system since the end of the cold war have 
created an environment more favorable for nuclear proliferation.”22  Some would argue 
that this view is not new and has been the ‘norm’ for those concerned by proliferation – 
                                                   
21 Ibid. 
 
22 Campbell, Kurt M., and Einhorn, Robert J. “Concluding Observations” in Campbell, Kurt M., Einhorn, 
Robert J., and Reiss, Mitchell B. (eds) The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Th ir Nuclear 





yet their dystopian visions had not come true. Former US President John F. Kennedy said 
in his Third Nixon-Kennedy Presidential Debate that  
“There are indications because of new inventions, that 10, 15, or 20 nations will 
have a nuclear capacity, including Red China, by the end of the Presidential office 
in 1964. This is extremely serious. . . I think thefate not only of our own 
civilization, but I think the fate of world and the future of the human race, is 
involved in preventing a nuclear war."23  
 
His prediction turned out to be inaccurate, as today’s security environment has only nine 
states possessing nuclear weapons, with one of those being purposefully opaque on their 
stance (Israel). Yet his fear is not unwarranted, an  fter his cut-off date of 1964, by 
which time the five Permanent Members of the UN National Security Council (and later 
the Nuclear Weapons States of the Nuclear Non-prolife at on Treaty of 1968), only so-
called rogue states have acquired the bomb (India, Pakistan, North Korea) with the 
exception of Israel.  
In effect, the value of nuclear weapons in the Cold War era is summed up best by 
Reiss in his “Nuclear Tipping Point” essay. In it, he states: “Deterrence – the idea that the 
United States could prevent a nuclear attack by the credible threat to retaliate with a 
devastating nuclear second strike – was widely credited with preserving the cold war’s 
nuclear peace.”24 Inasmuch as deterrence is concerned, Reiss’ assessment proved correct, 
at least in correlation. Some would argue that neither he US or the Soviet Union 
‘wanted’ to attack the other with nuclear weapons ad thus their strategic policies were 
                                                   
23 “JFK on Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
website, URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/11/17/jfk-on-nuclear-weapons-and-non-
proliferation/q94, accessed  March 28, 2012.  
 
24 Reiss, Mitchell B. “The Nuclear Tipping Point” in Campbell, Kurt M., Einhorn, Robert J., and Reiss, 
Mitchell B. (eds) The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Th ir Nuclear Choices. Brookings, 





just as much a reflection on their normative unwillingness to use weapons of such 
destructive capabilities as on their strategic calcul tions. 
 Yet as President Obama points out, the past system i  in decline. The stable bi-
polar US-Soviet nuclear relationship is no longer the norm, nor is it the defining 
convention of the international security environment of today. As Reiss points out in his 
essay, “Nuclear Tipping Point”: “New threats have arisen while the nuclear taboo has 
weakened.”25 Proliferation is a major threat to the nuclear balance of both regions and, 
consequently, the world. Iranian nuclearization is considered by many to be currently the 
largest proliferation threat to both the non-proliferation regime and Middle Eastern 
security. The best example to show how interconnected the problem of proliferation is in 
the international environment is by President Obama, in his Prague speech in 2009: “If 
the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving 
force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed.”26 Iranian 
nuclearization, at first, is a major destabilizing factor for Israel – and as such, to its ally 
the United States. Israeli strategic culture cannot all w a state that openly calls for its 
destruction to achieve the means of doing so. Conflict is almost certainly based on the 
two countries’ inevitable clash of strategic cultures. With Iran being able to blame 
Western countries as hypocritical to their commitment to their NPT commitment, the UN 
Security Council has no ‘normative’ tools at its diposal to counter Iran’s goals. Those 
states that have acquired nuclear weapons outside of th NPT have done so for self-
                                                   
25 Ibid., p. 13.  
 






survival, prestige, or relative geo-strategic gains reasons (India, Pakistan, and Israel are 
not signatories, and North Korea has resigned from the treaty), but state actor 
proliferation can be limited by current nuclear powers working on relinquishing their 
nuclear weapons.27   
 In effect, Nina Tannenwald’s taboo on use of nuclear weapons could be 
broadened to acquisition of them  if all states are on board. Perhaps the greatest counter 
to this would be Russian nuclear posture that states willingness to strike first with nuclear 
weapons, yet Russian strategic culture most likely uses this as a ploy to further Russian 
state security and prestige in the international community. Khrushchev’s son makes the 
claim that the entire Soviet arms build-up was not i tended for offensive purposes, but 
simply as a form of re-assured defense. Given Russian strategic culture of geographic 
openness and constant invasion, a higher buildup is perhaps justified even from a strictly 
defensive stance. Iran’s nuclear ambitions are destabilizing for both the region, with the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Turkey (and others) proliferating in kind. Etel Solingen 
argues that a “nuclearized Iran could trigger nuclear dominoes in Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Turkey, and Egypt”. 28 In effect, 
“building a strong international norm against the proliferation of such 
capabilities, even under the international safeguards, would not only raise the 
barrier to a state wishing to pursue nuclear weapons quickly and directly, but it 
would also make it harder to pursue a hedging strategy of acquiring a dual-use 
nuclear infrastructure and holding open the option for breakout at a later date.”  
                                                   
27 “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it
decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme 
interests of its country”, as stated in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  
 





Thus acquisition of nuclear weapons by state actors is a major threat, and the non-
proliferation regime must consider appropriate respon es to it. Some would posit that: 
“We can take some comfort in the […] conclusion that while the tipping-point 
phenomenon may be an apt metaphor for the process of proliferation, we are neither at 
the tipping point nor destined to reach it.”29 Yet the worries are more relevant and have 
larger potential for destruction:  
"But there is something very troublesome about this metaphor: movement toward 
the tipping point starts very slowly, picks up speed, and then becomes swift and 
irresistible. […] By the time the tipping process becomes readily identifiable, it 
may be very difficult to stop. And it [the international community] should act 
now, before it’s too late.”30 
 
 
Acquisition by Non-state Actors – Asymmetric Warfare  
As President Obama further states:  “ So, finally, we must ensure that terrorists 
never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global 
security.”31 Acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-state actors is probably the largest 
threat to both the proliferation regime and to indivi ual states, and as such, their 
populations. Most conventional theorists posit thatdeterrence fails against non-state 
                                                   
29 Campbell, Kurt M., and Einhorn, Robert J. “Concluding Observations” in Campbell, Kurt M., Einhorn, 
Robert J., and Reiss, Mitchell B. (eds) The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Th ir Nuclear 
Choices. Brookings, Washington DC, 2004., p. 333.  
 
30 Ibid., p. 334.  
 







actors vis-à-vis nuclear weapons – some32 posit that deterrence by denial would be a 
viable alternative. Non-state actor acquisition of uclear weapons is the largest threat to 
the international security environment. Nuclear weapons are not the only sort of WMD 
that are worrisome – the others are biological and chemical. Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 39, “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism,” issued on June 21, 1995, by the 
National Security Council under the signature of President Clinton, equates WMD with 
NBC weapons:  
“The United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective 
capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, 
biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists. The 
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a terrorist group is unacceptable.”33  
It is not only the United States who fears for such outcomes. The French advocate 
a similar stance in their White Paper on Defense and National Security. 34 The concept 
that post-Soviet era nukes are both unsafely guarded and as “loose nukes” are potentially 
available to non-state actors is both quite possible and extremely dangerous.  
“Under the Nunn-Lugar threat reduction programs, the United States over the last 
decade has devoted well over $7 billion to addressing this threat [limiting 
available fissile material] by assisting Russia andother former states of the Soviet 
Union to secure, account for, dismantle, and eliminate former Soviet weapons of 
mass destruction and related materials and infrastructure35” 
 
                                                   
32 Schmitt, Eric, and Shanker, Thom. Counterstrike. Henry Holt, New York, 2011. P. 46-64.  
33 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism,” issued on June 21, 1995. 
 
34 34 French White Paper on Defence and National Security, June 2008, from Council on Foreign Relations, 
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 as stated by Einhorn and Campbell. The movie Countdown to Zero36 shows this 
possibility in depth with interviews of former personnel guarding nuclear weapons. It 
also goes into the ramifications of the AQ Khan network and the potential for non-state 
actors to secure nuclear weapons through it. Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, a senior nuclear 
scientist and current head of the Quaid-e-Azam Univers ty in Islamabad, Pakistan, states 
explicitly that given the current power struggles within the Pakistani elite, the possibility 
of a nuclear weapon being misplaced by accident, stolen by force, bought or acquired by 
other means by non-state actors is high.37 Thus acquisition by non-state actors is not as 
remote as one would hope to believe.  The true danger is from these actors using weapons 
of mass destruction and nuclear weapons.  
  
Use by State Actors  
Although most experts would agree that the use of nuclear weapons by state 
actors is very remote, this possibility is not ruled out. Etel Solingen sums the situation  
Furthermore, nuclear weapons continue to be included in strategic doctrines. The United 
States has only committed to “no first use” under certain conditions (vis-à-vis an NPT 
member, if the latter does not attack the United States or its allies). The Clinton 
administrations’ 1994 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the role of nuclear weapons 
and did not rule out “first use”. The 2002 review instructed the Department of Defense to 
draft contingency plans for using nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear states. A 
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2005 draft revising the 1995 doctrine on nuclear use contemplated reliance on nuclear 
weapons to preempt attacks by state or non-state actors. Russia reversed Soviet no-first 
use commitments.38 Even those who have a strict no-first-use policy, such as the People’s 
Republic of China, exhibit worrisome behavior. General Zhu Chengu, dean of the 
National Defense University in China, said in 2005 that China could launch a nuclear 
attack on hundreds of US cities if the United States d cided to interfere militarily with 
Taiwan.39  
 
Use by Non-state Actors: Nuclear Terrorism where deterrence does not apply 
 Use by non-state actors is almost directly linked to acquisition by non-state actors, 
that is, those who have terrorist goals as their objectives. These violent non-state actors 
have been actively pursuing acquisition of WMD, and specifically, nuclear weapons, and 
have in rhetoric linked their acquisition to direct use. Deterrence, as outlined below, is 
not readily applied to their acquisition, and while “prestige, recognition” and other non-
security related reasons may play into their want for nuclear weapons, their main goal is 
use. In most conventional theory, deterrence by punishment is a concept which cannot be 
applied to terrorist cells – thus non-state actor acquisition of nuclear weapons will lead to 
their use. As Al Qaeda’s communications tell us, they seek WMD and will use them.  
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Deterrence by punishment is a very constricted concept when applied to non-state 
actors and terrorist cells. Some theorists would argue that this is not a major threat, as 
they can be deterred. Schmitt and Shanker point out the obvious difference between state 
and non-state actor deterrence: “Terrorists hold no obvious targets for American 
retaliation – targets like Soviet cities, factories, military bases and missile silos.” 40 They 
go on to outline that: “Part of deterrence strategy is to make sure that the other side 
knows that America will stop at nothing to punish it.”  41 Yet stopping at nothing is not the 
same as threatening total annihilation of Soviet exist nce, regardless of their success of 
attack on the United States. While Schmitt and Shanker would argue that deterring 
terrorists is a feasibility, in reality what they are saying is that a “deterrence by denial” 
concept would possibly “dissuade” terrorists from attacking.  
This conceptual approach is faulty for multiple reasons. First, the amount of 
resources needed to implement their strategy is extremely high. Second, those steps the 
authors outline do not conclusively state that the strategy merits the resources: the same 
resources would be better used to combat terrorism in other forms. Third, even if they 
achieve their strategic objectives, the only thing that will change is terrorist re-
interpreting their needed “chance of success” to strike. Thus, as outlined above, neither 
deterrence by punishment nor deterrence by denial are credible alternatives to combatting 
terrorists if and when they acquire nuclear weapons. They then pose a very clear and 
present danger. In “Combatting Nuclear Terrorism”, USNORTHCOM J-3 Staff tells it 
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would cause “unspeakable damage – not only physical, but also psychological, economic 
and geopolitical damage as well.”42 The best option for limiting and potentially 
eliminating non-state actor use of nuclear weapons is to decrease the number of warheads 
and, as the thesis’ end-state solution advocates, storing them in separate areas.  
 
Nuclear Accidents  
  The final, and perhaps greatest, danger nuclear weapons pose is accidents. 
Nuclear weapons accidents can be categorized in two separate categories: first, the direct 
-  nuclear weapons accidentally exploding or causing other kind of damage, but with no 
other consequences; and second, the indirect – the pres nce of nuclear arsenals and other 
accidents that potentially can trigger an unwanted uclear exchange, limited or escalating 
into global thermonuclear war. The first, the threats of direct accidents are accurately 
described by Scott Sagan, and history serves with multiple examples for the second. 
During the Cold War, multiple scenarios almost triggered global thermonuclear war.  
“Direct” threats were sometimes underplayed during the Cold War in an effort to 
keep nuclear technology from being discredited by grass-roots organizations. As Scott 
Sagan states 
“Throughout most of the cold war, there was […] underestimation of the risks of 
nuclear weapons accidents and even nuclear war. Part of the reason for this 
underestimation was that we lacked adequate theories about the underlying 
political and organizational causes of accidents wih hazardous technologies”43  
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He goes on to state that that “Even after serious accidents, such as when a nuclear 
bomber crashed in Greenland in 1968 or a nuclear missile blew up in Arkansas in 1980, 
the public was told that were no serious risks involved. ‘Don’t worry, be happy’ was the 
message.”44 The message has shifted considerably by today.  
The “indirect” threats associated with nuclear weapons are those that might 
inadvertently trigger nuclear war. In 1961, NORAD lost all communication with 
Strategic Air Command HQs and thus Ballistic Early Missile Warning Sites. While all B-
52s started their engine, the communication issue was resolved. In 1962, a B-52 
navigation error led it dangerously close to Soviet a rspace, who would have interpreted it 
as a sign of aggression. Yet perhaps the greatest example for a potentially cataclysmic 
accident is the 1995 missile launch. Russian officials observed an unknown missile on a 
trajectory that was headed for Russian air space. For the first time ever, the “nuclear 
briefcase” that at the time President Yeltsin held was activated for emergency use.45  The 
missile continued on its path,  
“but the radar crews continued to track their targets, and after about eight minutes 
(just a few minutes short of the procedural deadline to respond to an impending 
nuclear attack), senior military officers determined that the rocket was headed far 
out to sea and posed no threat to Russia.”46  
 
It turned out that it was a Norwegian planned launch that was weeks earlier 
announced to Russians but did not reach proper authorities. Yet even in a post-Cold War 
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world, the option of immediate retaliation before being subject to a strike was seriously 
considered. De-alerting nuclear stockpiles and separating warheads from delivery 









Chapter 4: The Changing Reality of War – Introduction of Normative Realities to 
Strategic Dialogues 
 
With the changes that conflict has undergone in the last twenty years, the concept 
of a nuclear free world is worth pursuing. While counter-intuitive and ahistorical, 
inasmuch as technologies of war have only been deemed inhumane and successfully 
avowed in the last one hundred years, the concept itself s, in the long run, plausible. 
There have been major shifts caused by globalization in the international security 
environment. The arms control regime and the treaties of the 20th century are perhaps the 
best example of how the end of World War II has shaped the international security 
environment. As Michael O’Hanlon states: “During the Cold War and its immediate 
aftermath, the nuclear superpowers considered it unrealistic to do much more than try to 
gradually reduce nuclear arsenals from their astronomical sizes.”47 Yet in the recent past 
arms control has achieved considerably more: in the Modern Era, Arms Control, as part 
of the normative discussion, has contributed meaningfully to the international security 
environment with multiple treaties: the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological 
Weapons Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapon, which did limit 
the size and destructive capability of the states th mselves.  
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Perhaps the greatest success of Arms Control and the most elaborate example for 
how the characteristics of war have changed is the INF treaty: the Intermediate-range 
Nuclear Weapons Treaty. This treaty has effectively outlawed intermediate-range nuclear 
weapons that were deployed in Europe to ease the stand-off between the Soviet Union 
and the United States, and consequently, NATO. The success of this treaty shows that 
states, in the Modern Era, are willing to forego potential strategic attack options to 
achieve stable relations. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement also 
builds on cooperation between the US and Russia to reduce threats in the future. Both of 
these show major changes in the international enviro ment and the changes that the 
character of war has undergone – normative concepts have meaningfully entered the 
picture. So, as O’Hanlon states, the concept of a nuclear weapons free world, earlier 
subjugated to the realm of a small fringe group of society, now has merit. “In the very 
last years of the century [20th], however, what had heretofore been an action itemfor the 
extreme Left became almost a mainstream cause."48 He goes on to outline that “Its 
members worry, not unreasonably, that, if retained, uclear weapons will someday be 
used, with catastrophic results for those immediately concerned and perhaps broader 
swaths of humanity as well.”49 
The changes to war as outlined above are relevant to understanding that the way 
forward for nuclear weapons free world is actually ttainable and a logical step for the 
non-proliferation regime. The Treaty of Westphalia pl ced the State as the ultimate 
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player in international relations, but with the advent of the United Nations, there is now a 
world-wide norm to which states that wish to wage war must conform. Albeit not always 
effective, the norm is still present and has had successes. The concept of the possibility of 
universally distributing blame through justice in war entered societal reality in the 20th 
century and was only codified in the latter half of it, coinciding with the rise of nuclear 
weapons. Michael Walzer in his book Just and Unjust Wars tates that “It is a crime to 
commit aggression [i.e., start wars].”50 This specific social construct is only relevant in a 
world where geopolitical realities have shifted significantly. Only with the creation of the 
United Nations and its introduction of two clauses – “to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace”51 and “All Members 
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered,”52 which were granted 
legitimacy due to the fact that 193 states have agred to abide by the charter, can the idea 
of universal agreements on “blame and crime” be introduced into the dialogue in a 
meaningful way. 
Nuclear deterrence is not a universally applied and universally accepted concept. 
Sometimes, it is not enough. Israeli strategic culture does not allow for mutual assured 
destruction and will not consider itself safe in a uclear dyad, even with both 
conventional and nuclear superiority. All it takes is one bomb on Tel-Aviv – Israel is 
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faced with an existential threat and will act to remove this threat.53 The Iranian-Israeli 
situation thus, inasmuch as nuclear deterrence is con idered, is very different from the 
‘stable’ nuclear dyads of the US-USSR and India-Pakist n. Further horizontal 
proliferation may lead to Israeli-Iranian nuclear dya s that will result in certain chaos and 
destruction. Previous Israeli strikes during Operation Opera on the Osirak reactor 
reinforce this concept.   
  
                                                   









Chapter 5: Nuclear Weapon States and the Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons  
 
The case for global zero is further reinforced not jus by international 
organizations’ call for a nuclear weapons free world, but by states as well. States, in the 
end, hold control over nuclear weapons – they are the ones with whom the ultimate 
decisions rest. Thus even if the United Nations and NATO both call for ‘global zero’, 
these statements must be backed up by political will of the party states.54  The three 
countries with the highest number of similar statements are then an ideal starting point to 
examining the potential for a world without nuclear weapons. All three of these states 
acquired and maintained nuclear weapons for a mix of different reasons: a combination 
of status, national security, or leader psychology. Through examining these states reasons 
for acquiring nuclear weapons, it is possible to asses  what steps have to be taken for 
these states to give them up. In general, there are fou  reasons why states acquire or seek 
to acquire nuclear weapons: state security, status, domestic political dynamics, and leader 
profile.55 While all four are interlinked, the way a state approaches its nuclear arsenal and 
its security relations stems from their strategic culture. China, France, and the US exhibit 
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very different strategic cultures and have very different reasons for acquiring nuclear 
weapons. By examining these states nuclear arsenals a d reasons for acquiring them, the 
required steps on the road to zero can be elucidated.   
Political statements that advocate for nuclear drawowns are not directly 
proportional to the states’ following through on their reductions. Through three state 
actors the link between “rhetoric” – political statements that emulate a nuclear weapons 
free world - and actual reductions is examined. The examples of France, China, and the 
US, clearly show that uniform causality between the two does not exist. The three cases 
present the following data: 
• French case: recent rhetoric, recent moderate nuclear drawdown 
• Chinese case: constant rhetoric, no shift 
• US case: Alternating rhetoric with recent increase, gradual decrease in 
weapons.  
Thus there exists a nuclear dilemma with regards to rhetoric and nuclear drawdowns. Yet 
the dilemma is not universal; each actor faces different ideological goals and different 
perceived geo-strategic realities. These actors have set their numbers to levels their own 
unique situation warrants, in their perception. Through these three examples, it will 
become evident that “effective” deterrence is a concept relative to the policy making elite 
and the time, and minimal deterrence is also a construct. Thus, with time, minimal 
deterrence can be re-interpreted, especially in an i ternational security environment that 





“Strategic nuclear deterrence is becoming far more c mplex than in the ‘first’ age. 
During the Cold War, the United States and its allies developed elaborate nuclear 
deterrence doctrines against a Soviet regime that turned out to be essentially 
conservative, stable, and unlikely to disrupt the status quo. After a short interlude 
in the 1990s, however, the world entered what Colin Gray has called ‘the second 
nuclear age,’ characterized by the original nuclear powers plus emerging states 
that either now have, or likely soon will have, nuclear weapons. Not all of them 
are stable, which poses serious questions for allied policymakers regarding how 
they will respond to proliferated nuclear threats, particularly with regard to 
deterrence strategies.”56  
 
Finally, through these three countries, their relative prospect to ascribing to Global Zero 
is visited.  
These three examples serve to show that achieving mi imal deterrence is feasible. 
France presents a textbook case of how political statements can be followed up by 
nuclear drawdowns. Yet even in France’s case, gettin  to zero today is unlikely. In effect, 
as made evident by the White Paper of 2008, France faces a dilemma: first, French 
leadership realizes that a stable nuclear deterrent mus  be maintained in a world with 
nuclear weapons but also is very much devoted to a w rld without nuclear weapons and 
the road to global zero. The People’s Republic of China’s current nuclear reserves of 240 
warheads with 176 deployed is nothing more than a strategic deterrent. Chinese Nuclear 
Policy is currently best described as “purely defensive in nature.” With such a limited 
arsenal, China cannot hope to use affirmative nuclear diplomacy to coerce other nuclear 
states to do its bidding, and its nuclear forces ascribe to “minimal deterrence”. With 
regards to the United States, President Obama’s famous declaration in Prague, in 2009: 
“So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace 
                                                   
56 “The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, i  Global Strategic Assessment 2009, Institute for 





and security of a world without nuclear weapons ” are the clearest indication that the 
current administration takes the matter of nuclear weapons very seriously. So far, the 
drawdowns have been effective but not close to a nuclear free world – yet the US is on 
the path to achieving “minimal deterrence” as well.  
These three countries show that the problem of nuclear weapons cannot and will 
not be solved in the near future. The current problems of deterrence and prestige 
associated with nuclear weapons inhibit states from relinquishing their nuclear weapons. 
This change can only come through gradual, generation l shifts, in which each generation 
will have an altered concept of strategic culture and thus, of deterrence, of the likelihood 
of nuclear attacks against them, and of the potential dangers posed by nuclear weapons 
and their cost. France, US, and China’s recent nuclear history will show that there already 
has been a generational shift in the concept of deterrence where the US has gone and 
France and China has not attempted to surpass the limits of “minimal nuclear deterrence”. 
This gradual shift, along with political statements, will lead the way in achieving the first 
few generational phases needed for global zero.  
 
France and Compliance to a Changing International Environment 
Perhaps France is the sole country whose nuclear arsen l cannot be justified 
solely by state security reasons. The justification for the nuclear arsenal resides mostly 
with prestige and leader psychology reasons. France’s development of nuclear weapons is 
a clear sign of French aspiration to great power statu  after two devastating world wars. 





aid of France during both World Wars. Thus, the extended nuclear deterrence of the US 
and NATOs “attack on one, attack on all” principle rovide sufficient deterrence from a 
strictly state security perspective. France acquired nuclear weapons for a different reason: 
the leaders’ psychology and their interpretation of status and prestige. As Prime Minister 
Mendes-France put it: “I fought for the right to the atomic bomb because it was 
intolerable that France suffer discriminatory treatment by the Americans and English and 
find itself reduced to the rank of Germany. My idea w s to keep the bomb as a 
negotiating tool.”57  
Currently, French nuclear forces are an independent nuclear deterrent, subject to 
the sovereign rule of France. While modest when compared to Russian or US numbers, 
France’s force de frappe (literally strike force) is the third largest nuclear arsenal in the 
world today. France is also a member of NATO, but France’s history with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization is not without hiccups (withdrawal from integrated 
command, re-locating NATO HQ to Belgium), yet its role as part of the Alliance is not to 
be taken lightly. Even more so, France is one of tw nuclear powers within the EU (the 
other being the United Kingdom), and a permanent member on the Security Council of 
the United Nations, and also one of the five recognized nuclear powers within the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. France’s role thus is crucial both with regards to 
Global Zero and within the concept of European Defense. In fact, France, a founding 
member of the EEC, was the first to initiate a more profound debate of European 
Defense, at the conference of St. Malo – the initial focal point to which most experts 
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revert back to whenever conceptual debates about the Common Foreign and Defense 
Policy or the European Security and Defense Policy arise. Thus it is clear that France, 
without wanting to, will be a key player in the future not only in the shaping of the 
Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union, but also of the Global 
Zero movement vis-à-vis the European Union. 58 While the New START Treaty only 
limits the nuclear warheads to 1550 per country, well beyond France’s levels, whose 
current nuclear forces - as estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute - are at 290 deployed warheads and 10 other warheads, for a total of 300 
warheads,59 and even below Global Zero’s new call of 1000 warheds endorsed by 
publicists at the New York Times,60 it is highly probable, if the rate of change remains 
the same, that the cuts will reach France’s arsenal within the foreseeable future.  
France’s nuclear history can be described as a trip from nationalism to 
international cooperation. These two concepts portrayed markedly different paths in 
France’s nuclear desires and actions. During France’s ationalist phase, France developed 
nuclear weapons, tested them, and increased its natonal nuclear arsenal. During 
international cooperation phase, France has worked on reducing the nuclear threat 
through cooperation with other countries. In the initial phase of nationalistic tendencies, 
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crises in identity drove the French to develop an independent nuclear deterrent.  While 
most would argue that it was the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 that drove the French to 
finally developing nuclear weapons that might just be a single part of the picture. During 
those stressful times, French identity was drawn into question with their territories future 
uncertain. 61 The Battle of Diên Biên Phu in 1954 left a permanent scar on French 
identity. While it is debated whether the French actu lly asked for United States nuclear 
intervention during the end days of that crisis, that t e possibility even raised itself and 
was treated with some credibility gives rise to the assumption that France, especially De 
Gaulle’s France, never again wanted to find itself in a position where France was 
dependent on others. France’s spirit of independence is evident from French history, and 
while whether they would actually have used nuclear weapons in Diên Biên Phu is very 
much debatable, the argument still holds. France’s los  of French colonies also 
exacerbated the loss of prestige and the desire to reclaim great power status. Thus the 
French Force de Frappe rose out of France’s nationalism in a time when French identity 
was in crisis, starting with the French nuclear test in 1960 leading to France developing 
the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, behind the United States and the Russian 
Federation, successor to the nuclear arsenal of the USSR.62 
 Post-de Gaulle France exhibits very different behavior. With increased European 
cooperation, France underwent significant changes in nuclear policy. While Michael Levi 
and Michael O’Hanlon argue that France “remains content with maintaining modest 
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deterrents”63, in effect France has exhibited mature nuclear policy through multiple stages 
that show that France is willing to reduce its nuclear weapons. France’s reliance on 
nuclear weapons was dictated more as a deterrent force than as a means for compellance. 
There comes a marked shift in French nuclear policy in the 1990s due to two major 
international events: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, and 
the consolidation of the EU, specifically through the Helsinki Accords and the Petersberg 
Tasks. With the advent of these two events, France has embarked on reduction of  nuclear 
forces as made evident by the following actions.64  
Perhaps the most significant event on the road to international cooperation was 
the signing of the NPT and with it Article VI detailing global disarmament.65 While 
France was not an original signatory party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
avoided the talks completely66, France did a role reversal later vis-à-vis the NPT. During 
the de Gaulle regime, France was furthering and streng hening French nuclear arsenal: 
first, the talks with Italy and Germany about nuclear cooperation were abruptly stopped67, 
second, France tested a nuclear weapon in 1960, and third, France became the third 
country to develop a nuclear Triad, with sea-, air-, nd land-based weapons systems. Yet 
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in 1992, France signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, mainly due to two major 
causes: first, the USSR, the greatest danger to Eurpean Defense post-World War II, 
disintegrated, and second, the increase in speed of Eur pean Integration with the Treaties 
of Nice, Maastricht, and Lisbon. France thus became  responsible member of the nuclear 
community.  
Not only did France sign treaties, France went on to actually decrease the French 
nuclear arsenal in response to the decrease of a need for a nuclear deterrent. After the end 
of the Cold War, France presumably disassembled 175 warheads associated with four 
systems removed from service. Along with this reduction, President Chirac's nuclear 
plans for 1997-2002 announced in February 1996 resulted in dismantling several weapon 
systems.68 France has also reduced its nuclear arsenal by half in nearly 10 years,69 which 
is the largest reduction in nuclear forces other than that of the United States and Russia. 
France also holds no nuclear weapons in reserve.70 Along with the dismantling of a large 
amount of nuclear weapons, France has also ceased production of plutonium in 1992 and 
of HEU in 1996.71 In much the same way, France has later decided to shut down facilities 
for fissile material production and the later on dismantle them.72  
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France’s original nuclear arsenal was composed of three separate branches, much 
like that of the United States. France based its policy f dissuasion on a strategic triad: 
land-air-sea. This is by no means warranted from a security standpoint. The French 
nuclear triad tried to match the triad of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the 
United Kingdom. Yet French nuclear strategy relies mainly on submarines, where three 
out of the four are operational any given time.  Each of the four nuclear submarines 
carries sixteen missiles with three sets of M45 missile  available to them, and at any time, 
only one or two submarines are on patrol in designated reas. France has thus in effect 
voluntarily reduced the number of its missile launchi g nuclear submarines in service by 
one third.73 Along with the changes in submarine-launched nuclear weapons, France has 
also completely dismantled its ground-to-ground nuclear component, in effect showing 
that the triad is not needed for state security reasons and status can fall victim of 
budgetary considerations.74 That alone is a major step in any country’s road to nuclear 
reductions, as France’s dismantling of the last Hades missiles took place in June of 1997. 
France currently possesses the following two types of Nuclear Weapons:75 the 
TN81, with a yield of 100 to 300 kilotons, and the TN75, with a yield of 100 kilotons. 
France is also in the process of developing two newtypes, the TNO (tête nucléaire 
oceanic) on M51 missiles, which are said to have a range of 6000 km and to be capable 
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of carrying up to six warheads. The CEA plans to deliver the warheads in 2015; and the 
TNA (tête nucléaire aéroportée), carried by the ASMP-A will have a range of 500 km and 
will have "improved maneuverability" and enhanced accuracy". The CEA boasts that the 
TNA is the first warhead in the world whose safety and functioning have been 
demonstrated, not by actual nuclear tests, but with the help of a program of simulation.76 
These nuclear warheads are very much limited in scope, ranging in the kiloton yields 
instead of the devastating multiple megaton yields some Russian and US nuclear 
warheads are capable of.France’s nuclear arsenal is very much secured, and while
proliferation remains an issue, 77 France’s primary concerns are the strategic use of 
nuclear weapons and not nuclear terrorism with French nuclear bombs.  
 As put forth by The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 
France faces multiple challenges that concern French nu lear forces, especially in a 
future with nuclear drawdown and even perhaps a nuclear weapons free world. In effect, 
as made evident by the White Paper of 2008, France faces, much as the United States or 
NATO, a dilemma: a stable nuclear deterrent must be maintained in a world with nuclear 
weapons -  
“Nuclear deterrence remains an essential concept of national security. It is the 
ultimate guarantee of the security and independence of France. The sole purpose 
of the nuclear deterrent is to prevent any State-originating aggression against the 
vital interests of the nation wherever it may come from and in whatever shape or 
form. Given the diversity of situations to which France might be confronted in an 
age of globalisation, the credibility of the deterrent is based on the ability to 
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provide the President, with an autonomous and sufficiently wide and diversified 
range of assets and options.78”  
 
France also is very much devoted to a world without nuclear weapons and the road to 
Global Zero: 
“France will have the means to develop its capability as long as nuclear weapons 
are necessary for its security. However, France has taken the initiative in the area 
of nuclear disarmament and shall continue to do so. France is particularly active 
in the fight against the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons 
as well as the delivery missiles.”79 
 
These challenges are not besetting France alone. This dilemma of working to maintain a 
stable nuclear deterrent when others have nuclear wpons, but trying to be on the 
forefront of reducing and later eliminating nuclear weapons is an issue besetting all states 
who advocate for zero. France is only a reluctant advocate for a world without nuclear 
weapons –French strategic culture, as outlined above, finds a major source of pride and 
prestige from its nuclear arsenal. Yet when the offr to extend French nuclear umbrella to 
the rest of Europe fell on deaf ears, France has shifted course. Potentially, France could 
gain just as much international recognition from leading the world without nuclear 
weapons and being at a forefront of this regime. The road to zero for a state who has 
nuclear weapons for prestige and status reasons is to change the status of nuclear 
weapons. Instead of nuclear weapons signifying great power status and a seat as a 
Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, nuclear weapons must be 
viewed by the international community as an abominatio , and those states possessing 
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them must be regarded as pariahs. If this becomes the case, status-based nuclear arsenals 
would lose their benefits, and as the example of France shows, could be eliminated.  
 
People’s Republic of China, No First Use, and Minimal Deterrence 
Chinese strategic culture exhibits a duality that has great potential for the global 
zero movement. China’s pragmatist strategy will potentially look to find breakout options 
from any global zero regime, but the political leadrship has stated on multiple occasions 
that they regard nuclear weapons as inhumane. There is no reason to accept these 
commitments at face value, so for China to be part of this regime, the cost-benefit 
analysis must be in China’s favor. China is an ideal ex mple for an excellent candidate 
for the future of the nuclear weapons abolishment movement. The China Defense White 
Paper 2006 is critical in understanding the road to zer : Its fundamental goal is to deter 
other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. Thus 
China already exhibits the needed clauses for future reductions – it relies on minimal 
deterrence and posits that its nuclear force is deterrence only against other nuclear 
weapons.  
This stance is key for the future of the nuclear globa  zero regime. If nuclear 
weapons serve solely as an anti-nuclear deterrent, than nuclear drawdown becomes an 
acceptable goal. In today’s security environment, where states face constrained budgets, 
efficiency in defense spending is paramount. Strategy dictates that resources be allocated 
in the most efficient way, and if ten can achieve th  same effect, there is no need for three 





warhead becomes more “valuable” if lost. Thus past a certain number, only multilateral 
quasi-simultaneous drawdowns are feasible to avoid any comparative advantages for 
states. If, on the other hand, nuclear weapons serve potential offensive purposes or serve 
as deterrent for other type of WMD attacks or even co ventional ones, nuclear 
drawdowns become highly complicated and less likely. Thus Russian war strategies with 
nuclear strikes followed by conventional attacks are  major stumbling block on the road 
to zero, and have to be addressed before further drawdowns are possible. In much the 
same way, through the example of the US, the problems of using a nuclear deterrent for 
other type of attacks is addressed. The Chinese case serves as an example of how even a 
state facing multiple security constraints can keep its nuclear arsenal for the sole purpose 
of deterring nuclear attacks.  
The People’s Republic of China first tested a nuclear weapon on October 16, 
1964, becoming the fifth nuclear power in the world and the final United Nations 
Security Council member (and later NPT Nuclear Weapons State) to do so80. 
Immediately after the test, China issues a communiqué:  
“[China] proposes to the governments of the world that a summit conference of 
all the countries of the world be convened to discus  the question of the compete 
prohibition and thorough destruction of the nuclear weapons, and that as the first 
step, the summit conference conclude an agreement to the effect that the nuclear 
powers and those countries which may soon become nuclear powers undertake 
not to use nuclear weapons either against non-nuclear ountries and nuclear-free 
zones or against each other. We are convinced that man, who creates nuclear 
weapons, will certainly be able to eliminate them.”81 
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The Chinese high command since then has not issued a countermand to this proposition. 
The current nuclear policy of China on this subject can be traced back to this first 
proposition – yet with the grand changes that the world has undergone is it in the long-
term strategic interest of China to pursue this goal? With the culmination of the global 
zero movement into the Global Zero campaign, China must re-assess strategic interests in 
light of these new developments. 82 The larger, and perhaps more prominent question, of 
nuclear terrorism and dirty bombs must also be considered. With an unknowable portion 
of former Soviet weapons unaccounted for, China’s interests versus nuclear terrorism are 
complex and may not necessarily coincide with strategic nuclear interests.   
Their current nuclear reserves of 240 warheads with 176 deployed are nothing 
more than a strategic deterrent. In effect, China ascribes to a minimal deterrence policy as 
described by Herman Kahn in his book on nuclear war, Thinking about the Unthinkable 
in the 1980s. Kahn states that in a minimal deterrence position,  
“one does not need many nuclear weapons to deter a nuclear-armed opponent. 
Only a minimal nuclear retaliatory capability is required, since the overwhelming 
damage that could be wreaked by even a few nuclear w pon detonations could 
be enough to make any enemy calculations of surviving a war very 
questionable.”83  
 
China can sustain a first strike and have sufficient r turn capabilities to cause 
significant damage to major cities of the attacking nation-state. China currently ascribes 
to one major nuclear policy: to retaliate following a nuclear attack. Because Beijing’s 
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sole nuclear mission is to retaliate against cities, known as a “counter-value missions”, it 
hopes that its nuclear stockpile is large enough to de er any possible attackers from 
attempting a strike. Chinese Nuclear Policy is currently best described as “purely 
defensive in nature.” With such a limited arsenal, China cannot hope to use affirmative 
nuclear diplomacy to coerce other nuclear states to do its bidding. China has also vowed 
not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers. Y t perhaps China’s greatest 
commitment, if taken at face value, is Chinese No First Use policy84. As China ascribes 
to No-First-Use policy, it claims that Chinese nuclear forces can only be used as 
retaliation for an attack by nuclear weapons. While whether China will actually follow 
this policy is up for debate, so far there are no realistic scenarios where China would gain 
an advantage from using part of its current nuclear warheads as an offensive weapon. 
Ascription to No-First-Use is a crucial element to he pursuit of a road to zero. This 
concept of publicly stating and accepting that nuclear forces only exist to deter other 
nuclear attacks is essential to furthering the cause of global zero, as it bounds the problem 
to a manageable situation.  
China’s Nuclear Arsenal also acts as a strategic deterrent for emergency 
situations. It is small enough that it is non-threatening to the other Nuclear Powers – the 
240 warheads would not play a major part in a possible thermonuclear war, but it is there 
if anytime in the future other foreign powers threaten Chinese sovereignty or the CCP’s 
supremacy, it is there as a strategic reserve to fall back on, most likely merely as 
deterrence, but still there. In effect, when China starts to consider relinquishing its 
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nuclear capabilities, there are three major and three minor issues to consider at this time. 
Very likely two of the minor ones can and will evole into major ones over the next two 
decades, but at this point they are still to be classified as minor. 
  China is in a unique position when it comes to memb rs of the nuclear Club. 
China holds infamous record of having the most nuclear neighbors: four. By comparison, 
the second places in this ranking have only two. While geographic proximity is not one of 
the main factors when calculating for nuclear exchanges, the importance of it cannot be 
ignored. Nuclear capabilities are measured in two distinct ways – first, the strength and 
devastative power of the nuclear warheads and second, the capability of delivering these 
warheads. The usual reason why proximity is not part of the traditional calculation is that 
the two superpowers in the arms race were separated by an ocean and a continent. Yet the 
effects of proximity must enter into Chinese calculations. It takes less effort to develop a 
missile that only has to go a few miles to hit Chinese soil than it does to travel thousands 
of miles. China has three of the newest nuclear members as neighbors, India, Pakistan, 
and North Korea, who, without advanced missile technology do not pose a threat to other 
nuclear countries but may do so for China. 
At this point, while major thermonuclear war is unlike y, China’s nuclear arsenal 
keeps an additional player involved in the equilibrium. During the bi-polar nuclear world 
of the Cold War, the level of nuclear tension was constantly mounting as the two 
superpowers increased their nuclear arsenals at a growing rate. The issue then was global 
thermonuclear war initiated by and between the US and USSR, which is no longer the 





plans with only two players – and the possibility of strategic gain where only one enemy 
or opponent is involved is much greater then when one has to deal with multiple foes all 
with nuclear capabilities. It is arguable that more nuclear capabilities increase the risk of 
someone initiating conflict, thus the deterring factor of the increased possibilities make 
for a strategically sounder no-first-use policy to limit nuclear responses to nuclear 
attacks. Not one of the countries would dare to risk being in a position that after an initial 
attack they would be left defenseless against not oly retaliation but opportunistic attacks 
as well.  
 While it may be obvious, it is not in China’s interest to engage in a major 
international nuclear conflict. Even if in an unlikely and very improbable situation that 
China would emerge as a clear victor in nuclear conflict, as one of the war fighting 
scenarios of Herman Kahn outlines, in this scenario China would still be worse off in 
absolute terms than it is now. While the strategic state-level implications show that China 
cannot at this point adhere to a Global Zero policy, China by no means can be satisfied 
with a MAD (mutual assured destruction) policy that a world with high levels of nuclear 
weapons shows.  
China is in a perilously weak position if a nuclear xchange would happen 
between any two nuclear states. China’s strategic rserves are dangerously low if any all-
out nuclear conflict would ensue. China so far has spent a smaller amount of resources on 
nuclear weapons. To equalize the distribution discrepancy between China and the other 
members of the nuclear club, China could also increase its nuclear arsenal to a major 





arsenal to a smaller level. In this aspect, China has a vested interest in ascribing to a 
campaign that would resemble Global Zero in essence.  
Nuclear capable states are those that have the possible capability but have not 
developed nuclear weapons. This category can and will expand significantly if nuclear 
energy becomes a viable alternative for fossil fuels, or if energy scarcity becomes a more 
pressing issue. Currently, China has to focus on two countries that have the capability and 
play a major part of Chinese strategic interests: Iran and Japan. Chinese policy towards 
Iran should be exactly what China has been doing as a member of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty; Iran should not be allowed to develop 
nuclear weapons. Japan, as a historical competitor of China, has to be considered 
differently. While the Japanese have renounced war as a means of settling international 
disputes and currently have a very limited standing army, their leadership is tenuous at 
best with governments changing too often for China to be able to count on Japan as a 
reliable neighbor. In effect, a statement by a high level Japanese official can be 
interpreted as a warning sign that Japan might be considering developing nuclear 
weapons.  Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, calling for Japan to develop a nuclear 
deterrent in response to evolving regional threat, s id that: “All our enemies: China, 
North Korea and Russia -- all close neighbors -- have nuclear weapons. Is there another 
country in the world in a similar situation?”  
 While not in direct collision course with either non-nuclear states, which are those 
that fit in neither nuclear nor non-nuclear categories, China must consider the 





aggrandizement of its nuclear arsenal will be seen as a threatening move for these states. 
Second, a plausible renunciation of nuclear weapons would increase these states potential 
ties with China. China’s African interests would be best served if China maintained a 
course that portrayed Beijing in a light of a responsible member of the international 
community. It is, on the other hand, in China’s strategic interest to avoid a thermonuclear 
war. The possibility of nuclear weapons becoming irrelevant rests on not finding these 
weapons as there are more than adequate ways to hide launch capabilities either in 
submarines or bases, but in being able to avert and neutralize the missiles before impact.   
 
United States and Global Zero: Shifting Norms and Realities 
The United States is perhaps the best example of how normative goals interact 
with strategic realities in a single policy making elite. The United States reasoning to 
acquire and maintain nuclear weapons are perhaps most complex with novelty, scientific 
progress, and superpower status as driving forces in the initial stages and state security 
contributing to the subsequent buildup, but the position that the United States holds in the 
current security environment enables it to shape it effectively. The Obama Administration 
is a key piece to furthering global zero. As Presidnt Obama stated in Prague: “And as 
nuclear power – as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear 
weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this 
endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.”85 Others would agree with this. Reiss 
                                                   







points out in Nuclear Tipping Point hat “Washington’s leadership of the non-
proliferation regime and its efforts to prevent thespread of nuclear weapons will be 
critical for success.”86  
Significantly, this is the same meaning assigned to the term in official documents 
issued by the Clinton administration. President Clinton issued Executive Order 12938 
(“Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”) on November 12, 1994, which stated: 
the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (“weapons of mass 
destruction”) and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat. In Reykjavik and 
with Ronald Reagan’s presidency, the United States came close to eliminating the threat 
of nuclear weapons. With the Soviet acquisition of the bomb, the words global 
thermonuclear war were not mere propaganda, and the term Mutual Assured Destruction, 
mad as it was, became real. US policy makers were vry aware of this reality and were 
also intent on coming up with solutions to it. As John F. Kennedy put it: "Every man, 
woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of 
threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident, or miscalculation, or by 
madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us."  
While more and more rhetoric is surfacing on part of the Permanent Members of 
the Security Council of the United Nations87 that they would be willing to give up nuclear 
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weapons if others would do so, the only action currently being implemented is the 
bilateral reductions in strategic nuclear weapons between the US and Russia, as a leftover 
project from the Cold War. The New START Treaty currently in progress builds on 
previous treaties, such as SALT I, SALT II, and START I. President Obama’s famous 
declaration in Prague, in 2009: “So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's 
commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons88” are the 
clearest indication that the current administration ake the matter of nuclear weapons very 
seriously.  
The strategic culture of the United States is the key to any action on the route to a 
world without nuclear weapons. The United States exhibits a certain duality in its 
approach to foreign affairs, eloquently elicited by Walter MacDougal. MacDougal argues 
that the foreign policy of the United States has always been an apparent contradiction 
between idealism and realism.89 To achieve the goal of global zero, a responsible state 
needs to be found who can believe id alistically in the safeguarding of mankind all the 
while maintaining a realist approach to how such a grand scheme can be carried out 
without other, less idealistic countries, gaining a str tegic advantage. The United States 
fits this description perfectly. As Obama’s speech further states: “First, the United States 
will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold 
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War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security 
strategy, and urge others to do the same.90” Thus it is clear that “ideologically” the United 
States is very much committed to reducing this risk, and the risk is very real. Yet Obama 
goes on to prove that the US is just as much a realist: “As long as these weapons exist, 
the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, 
and guarantee that defense to our allies.”91 
To illustrate the fact that the world has changed one need look no further than the 
largest attack the United States has had in the last century. It was not in any land based 
battle or sea conflict, nor in a nuclear exchange between superpowers, but an attack 
carried out by a few select individuals with proper training and adequate resources. The 
terrorist attacks against the twin towers of the World Trade Center changed the scope of 
conflict forever. Such a massive scale attack led to the re-organization of United States 
national security protocol, led to the introduction of the Patriot Act and President Bush 
declaring a global war on terror.92   
The world of warfare has changed substantively. The United States no longer 
faces a single conventional army that the military has to be prepared to fight. The U.S. no 
longer has a near-peer competitor in military matters and instead of focusing on a 
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possible World War III, the United States should re-assess its military needs. 93 China, the 
rising superpower, would agree. Deng Xiaoping concluded in 1982 “that the world was 
tending toward peace and development, [and that] the possibility of a world war was 
remote”94 but also send a strong signal to future transnatiol terrorist originations by 
striking down hard on Al Qaeda. Bruce Riedel also believes that Al Qaeda is most likely 
to produce a nuclear bomb from “their own back yard.”95 As Osama Bin Laden has been 
killed by American Special Forces, the threat of retaliation looms on the horizon. As 
shown previously, it is unseemly to believe that America’s nuclear deterrent will stop any 
further terrorist attacks.  
Three major issues present themselves when focusing on uclear arsenals from a 
defensive standpoint for the United States. First, the strategic deterrent value they have in 
state-level conflict. Second, their retaliatory value in view of other WMDs and CBRN 
weapons. Third, their economic costs must be justified for them to be valid.  The first, the 
issue was global thermonuclear war initiated by and between the US and USSR, which is 
no longer the case. While nuclear war was averted, military strategists were able to 
develop scenario plans with only two players – and the possibility of strategic gain where 
only one enemy or opponent is involved is much greater then when one has to deal with 
multiple foes all with nuclear capabilities. While t is arguable that more nuclear 
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capabilities increase the risk of someone initiating conflict, in reality the deterring factor 
of the increased possibilities make for a strategically sounder no-first-use policy. Not one 
of the countries would dare to risk being in a positi n that after an initial attack they 
would be left defenseless against not only retaliation but opportunistic attacks as well.  
During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was a valid theory. With the United 
States strongly committed to the security of Europe in both the Organization of Security 
and Cooperation in Europe and more importantly in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, the United States’ had limited options to guarantee its commitments. The 
United States’ commitments are articulated in the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 3 and 5. 
Article 3 of the Treaty provides that the allies “separately but jointly, by means of 
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their 
individual collective capacity to resist armed attack.”96 In Article 5, the parties agreed 
that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe and North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all.”97  At the end of World War II, the Soviet-US 
cooperation between Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin started to be put under pressure. The 
dynamic of the relationship has switched from co-operation against a common enemy to 
a competitive and hostile relationship. Under Presid nt Truman, the United States had to 
consider how best to deal with the Soviet Union. 98  
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Yet the changes that have happened since the end of the Cold War are undeniable. 
The three traditional roles of nuclear weapons in US policy are: a foundational strategic 
nuclear deterrent, protecting the US itself from nuclear or survival-threating threats; a 
nuclear umbrella for allied states; and third is a deterrent against strategic or operational 
threats from WMD at a regional level. 99 The first is no longer the case with the implosion 
of the Soviet Union. The second one might not be needed given the changes in the way 
US allies approach nuclear weapons and threats. The third may still be a credible option, 
but the potential costs may outweigh the benefits. Inasmuch as countering any of these 
threats, the Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 states hat, for the US to enhance its national 
security, it should prevent the use of nuclear weapons, reduce their role in US National 
Security, and reduce their numbers to as few as posible. 100 
The United States nuclear arsenal is also the source of two major problems that 
might very likely upset the delicate balance of the int rnational security environment: 
American nuclear primacy and Iranian nuclearization. The threat that Iran will become a 
nuclear power is made out to be a very likely one in current literature, with Iran being 
able to develop nuclear bomb capability any minute now. The Iranian leadership with 
Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei has expressed thir willingness to acquire these 
weapons. The only other power in the Middle East with nuclear capabilities, although 
unofficial, is Israel. Israel’s unique position amidst its neighbors if not justifies, at least 
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explains Israel’s nuclear wishes. Iran’s reasoning to acquire nuclear weapons as defensive 
capabilities might be the start of a diabolical circle. If Israel acquired nuclear weapons to 
defend against the larger conventional force, and Iran now acquires nuclear weapons to 
defend against a plausible Israeli nuclear threat, Israel has to up the ante: if this circle 
starts, there is no telling where it will end up. Iranian nuclearization would be a major 
upset to the balance and the status quo of the Middle Eastern region. As recent events 
have shown, any upset in the Middle East affects the economic world significantly. While 
the world relies on oil as a prime energy source, th  peace in the Middle East is of 
paramount importance to international security and economy. Finally, Iranian succession 
is tenuous at best, more correctly labeled as unpredictable with relatively little oversight 
onto the process and the successor. Power struggles within the country could lead to a 
leader with little-to-no regard for the sanctity of human life in the Western sense, 
someone who could conceive of the use of Nuclear Weapons to bring about either 
religious ideologies or a return of the Caliphate. Arguments can be made that if Iran 
develops enough nuclear strike capabilities to takeout Israeli second-strike capabilities, it 
would pursue a stronger military campaign against the Israelis in accordance with the 
Arab world’s policy in 1948. Iran consistently cites the US nuclear arsenal as a source of 
fear and justifies its actions only as defensive. Without a US nuclear arsenal, many other 
nuclear capable countries would lose this justification for their development of nuclear 
capabilities. 
  American nuclear primacy is also of major concern. History has shown that these 





situation might have changed substantially from the tim  when they were discredited. 
The traditional argument, as put forward by Lieber and Press, stresses the importance of 
the possibilities of more aggressive foreign policy practiced by the United States. “The 
strategic nuclear balance has shifted dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and the 
United States now stands on the cusp of nuclear primacy.”101 Lieber and Press also point 
out that “The implication is that in future high-stakes crises, U.S. leaders may consider 
initiating nuclear war just as they did in the past. And to avoid such circumstances, U.S. 
adversaries will work hard to mitigate their vulnerability.”102 
More importantly, even though the US is the only country ever to have used 
atomic weapons that was a single incident when the capabilities of the weapons were 
untested in war and the argument justifying their use was to save more lives in a probable 
prolonged war. While the ‘qui custodet ipsos custodes’ argument is certainly valid, the 
US enjoyed nuclear monopoly until the Soviets acquired nuclear weapons and nuclear 
primacy until the 1960’s where Soviet missile technology became moderately reliable. 
Yet the US has not used nuclear weapons in any other way but as a strategic deterrent 
from Soviet aggression. 
Finally, what the United States has to weigh carefully is put forth eloquently by 
Keith Payne in his article in the Air Force Strategic Studies Journal:  
“The question is whether we are willing to accept the risk of deterrence failure on 
those occasions in which the United States could not threaten nuclear escalation, 
possibly including threats to some adversaries’ highly valued/protected targets. The 
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added risk of deterrence failure flowing from such an inability surely cannot be 
calculated a priori with precision. It may be nonexistent or high, depending on the 
specific circumstances of the contingency. Even if the risk of deterrence failure for 
this reason is low, however, the possibility would still deserve serious consideration 
because the consequences of a single failure to deter WMD attack could be measured 
in thousands to millions of US and allied casualties. And, of course, that risk may not 
be low.”103 
 
Dunn Lewis argues that “past experience indicates that if a country’s leadership 
decides to pursue nuclear weapons, the Article II ‘no manufacture and no acquisition’ 
obligations will not be a significant constraint.104” Potter and Gaukhar would concur that 
the channels of control currently in place cannot achieve the goals set forth nor stop the 
proliferation process. They point out that:  
“The overall record of proliferation prognoses by government intelligence analysts 
and political science scholars alike instills little confidence that the international 
community will receive early warning about emerging nuclear weapons threats. 
Repeatedly, both communities have failed to anticipate significant nuclear weapons 
developments in a timely fashion or, in some instances, have missed them altogether. 
Examples of proliferation surprises include the first Soviet and Indian nuclear 
explosions, the initiation and successful development of Israeli nuclear weapons, the 
timing of India’s second and Pakistan’s first nuclear tests, the rise and demise of 
Iraq’s nuclear activities, and the nature and scope of North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
ambitions.”105 
 
Thus it is clear that the current state of the international security environment is 
not ready to follow up on their original desire to eliminate nuclear weapons and the 
United States must choose a different approach to global zero. As Levi and O’Hanlon 
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state: “complete disarmament, is entirely unrealistic for the foreseeable future, given the 
security risks inherent in American denuclearization”106 As Barack Obama so aptly 
stated, a nuclear free world might not happen in his lifetime, but it is time to start on the 
road. Even if all nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated due to strategic deterrent factors, 
the journey to zero would increase the security of the global community multifold.  The 
United States is in a unique position to grant credibility to this initiative and the political 
capital to carry it through, either through diplomatic or economic means. Griffith and 
Campbell would argue that the “US policy breaks new ground is its effort to rebalance 
the three foundational nuclear roles so that he US nuclear posture itself enhances nuclear 
non-proliferation.”107 They also outline that the process, even from US policy standpoint, 
will not be quick. Technical limits to disarmament and verification, along with 
multilateral negotiations, all add significant time d lays to any agreement.108 
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Chapter 6: The Way Forward 
 
 Nuclear Drawdown and the Role of Global Zero 
 The problems of nuclear weapons and the idea that they have to be eliminated 
from state level strategic planning dates back to the inception of the United Nations. In 
June of 1946, at Dumbarton Oaks, a plan to deal with the future of nuclear weapons was 
already introduced. The Baruch Plan, as introduced by US ambassador to the UN, 
Barnard Baruch, at the first session of the UN Atomic Energy Commission, called for the 
complete transfer of all US atomic weapons and facilities to an international organization 
– in this case the United Nations.109 Given the fact that in 1946, only the United States 
had nuclear weapons (the Soviet Union did not successfully test until 1949), this called 
for international stewardship of nuclear weapons. More importantly, this plan called for 
the UN to have authority and use physical force to compel states to comply to this.110 Yet 
this plan, even though it was subsequently introduce  by the US to the UN Security 
Council for the following ten years, met zero success.111 Thus perhaps the states 
themselves or an international organization made up of these states is unable to achieve 
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success in this crucial matter, but a smaller transn tional advocacy group can, and Global 
Zero is well equipped to attempt the challenge.  
Global Zero is a growing initiative that intends to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the 
world. Disarmament and non-proliferation are the two main pillars of Global Zero which 
then lead to a total nuclear relinquishment of all weapons. The campaign, started in 
December 2008, includes many high level signatories f om multiple different venues of 
life. Notable signatories include: South African Frederik Willem de Klerk, German 
Helmut Schmidt, former USSR Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, and former US President 
Jimmy Carter. As shown with the changing realities in war, the world is no longer that of 
the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War environme t. This work states that 
although multiple other such networks exist calling for the abolishment of nuclear 
weapons, Global Zero’s action plan is potentially most effective as a strategy for putting 
the world on a path of no nuclear weapons: 
• based on their interpretation of nuclear weapons,  
• the roles they assign to Nuclear Weapons States and the other players 
• their proposed multinational strategic talks, and  
• the educational and grass-roots actions they take.  
Through their 4 Phased Action Plan with de-alerting, de-targeting, and later US-
Russian bilateral talks, followed by multinational conferences are key to going further 
down this road. 112  Global Zero’s action plan is perhaps the most effective and best 
thought out, yet even their Action Plan is too short-te m for it to achieve lasting effects. 
                                                   






Global Zero’s action plan also has problems with proliferation and verification, with 
current technology unable to provide for total overvi w. As Colby states in “Nuclear 
Abolition: A Dangerous Illusion” article, US conventional force superiority might not last 
forever, and thus, ironically, the greatest proponent of global zero might turn back to 
nuclear weapons. 113 In the same manner, Russian defense policy of the recent past has 
decided to rely more heavily on their Strategic Rocket Forces – thus Global Zero’s 
Action Plan over here would also hit major obstacles in the near future. The reasons 
behind and the arguments against future retention of nuclear weapons have been outlined, 
both in general and with regards to specific countries. Global Zero’s pitfalls to achieving 
their strategic goals can be remedied, as outlined i  the last chapter of this work, The Way 
Forward. This work diverges from Global Zero’s Action Plan d outlines an alternative 
method to address the problems of nuclear weapons and their inherent inhumane 
consequences to achieve a more stable world.  
Furthermore, Global Zero does all it can to maintain he taboo on the “use” on 
nuclear weapons by grouping all ‘low-yield’ or other nuclear weapons under the same 
umbrella. This peril has been recognized before: as Pre ident Lyndon Johnson stated: 
“Make no mistake. There is no such thing as a conventional nuclear weapon. For 
nineteen peril-filled years no nation has loosed the atom against on another. To do 
so now is a political decision of the highest order. And it would lead us down an 
uncertain path of blows and counterblows whose outcome none may know.”114 
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 Global Zero is well aware of this, and is currently pursuing the removal of US 
and Russian Tactical Nukes from European Combat bases,  outlined in their GZ 
NATO-Russia Commission Report.115 Yet their strategic timeline is too short. Their 
terms for initiating a multilateral nuclear disarmaent talks is 2012-2013, which is highly 
unrealistic. Global Zero wishes to proceed to quickly, and ignores the fact that strategic 
culture must first adapt to one reality before it can tackle the next. The way forward to a 
nuclear weapons free world must take this into account. Even Henry Kissinger, four years 
after calling for global abolishment of nuclear weapons, realized that the path has to be 
gradual with each stage meeting security criteria. He states in an op-ed with former 
National Security Adviser Scowcroft, that the “goal f future negotiations should be 
strategic stability and that lower numbers of weapons should be a consequence of 
strategic analysis, not an abstract preconceived determination.”116  
Along with strategic state-level considerations, Global Zero also employs 
methods that show that it is ready to approach this problem in the long term – and if 
unable to achieve this with the current, leadership, Global Zero is indirectly working on 
altering the strategic culture of the policy makers of the future. With their aid and 
marketing of the movie Countdown to Zero, Global Zero is shifting their target audience 
from the current ‘children of the Cold War’ to the ‘children of globalization’. The 
following example is a reason Global Zero is best-equipped with long-term strategic 
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thought to achieve change. This campaign ad shows that Global Zero is not only aware of 
the economic cost associated with the retention of nuclear weapons, but uses them to 
show the potential trade-offs these costs would incur.  
 
 
World leaders will spend $1 trillion on nukes in the next 10 years 
while cutting essential services that we all need! Will you take 






1 NUKE = 400 COLLEGE SCHOLARSHIPS 
As budgets get squeezed, government has responded with tuition hikes, less 
financial aid and overcrowding in primary schools. The cost of 1 nuke could fund 
400 scholarships, and the U.S. has over 8,000 nukes!117 
 
These types of programs, along with the creation Global Zero chapters in universities and 
colleges, sponsoring workshops and conferences, to have the population, the electorate, 
call on change from below. This approach works bestfor democratic or polyarchic 
societies, yet it can also apply to non-democratic ones. The pressure encountered would 
not come from direct voting but from the population through indirect means. The ruling 




                                                   





Generational and Long-term Change  
 As outlined above, nuclear weapons do pose significa t dangers to society. Global 
thermonuclear war, although low in probability, is h ghly cataclysmic, and even limited 
nuclear exchanges are catastrophic beyond anything wit essed in the history of human 
conflict. Yet state and national security, as shown by the examples of France, US, and 
China, warrants their existence. The downsides of nuclear arsenals are varied and 
significant. Non-state actors acquisition of nuclear weapons is perhaps the largest threat, 
as deterrence fails with them. Proliferation also poses major challenges to maintaining 
stable nuclear relations. Accidents and mismanagement of nuclear stockpiles are two 
crucial reasons why further thought has to be given to the possible elimination of nuclear 
weapons. Equally important is the taboo on the use of nuclear weapons, as put forth by 
Nina Tannenwald.118 This taboo on the use does exist, and should be maintained lest the 
lines blur between strategic nuclear weapons and smaller, lower yield explosions. The 
problem is clear: first, states must be able to maintain deterrence in what they perceive to 
be a stable way, yet the inherent dangers of nuclear w pons do require action. Inasmuch 
as deterrence is considered, it is just as much a strategic reality as it is a construct, as 
made evident by how different policy makers approach it. The key thing with nuclear 
weapons is that they are in fact under civilian control and not just another tool of the 
military. What most advocacy groups fail to recognize is that outlining a single-step 
solution is thus currently infeasible. Instead, they – and in this specific case, Global Zero, 
                                                   





as it is the best suited to do this and has the structure already in place – should focus on 
approaching the problem more in the long-term.   
The argument to attempt to abolish nuclear weapons immediately has too many 
constraints in the current security environment to be feasible now. Yet the dangers are 
present and warrant action. The road to global zerothus has to be a slow and steady one, 
not with multiple phases, but with sequential Stages – ach with a clear strategic 
objective, that, once achieved, must be accepted as the new norm of the international 
community for the next stage to be able to be initiated. For these new norms to become 
the status quo time must pass. This work posits that at least one generation must pass 
since the adoption of the old stage and the implementation of the new (as substantiated by 
the shift from the Cold War Generation to the Post-Cold War Generation’s strategic 
thought), but the time may vary and with new challeng s arising, it may be lengthened or 
shortened. There are two other major considerations hat all nuclear weapons states have 
to work on achieving relatively quickly: the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  
The FMCT is essential in limiting horizontal proliferation and while not 
quintessential to progress, it does pose major benefits to the non-proliferation regime. 
Some authors, such as Amitai Etzioni, conclude that the FMCT would have to come into 
effect before disarmament can progress forward,119 and as such, he believes that positive 
incentives can work to have states with high terrorism risk (Pakistan and Iran) renounce 
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their nuclear programs. While commendable, the problem with this approach is that 
Pakistani state security, the survival of their regime in Pakistani strategic culture, depends 
on nuclear weapons.  
When asked to renounce their nuclear weapons program, P kistani government 
officials first will point to Delhi’s nuclear warheads, then point out US hypocrisy towards 
their commitment to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and third will posit that they 
are responsible and mature members of the International Community who have not used 
nuclear weapons even when clashing with India.  ThePakistani nuclear weapon was a 
response to the Indian bomb. The proximity of Islamabad to Delhi, the permanent 
conflicting tension and the difference in strategic cultures all lead to it being infeasible 
that one state would give up their nuclear weapons when the other has them. Western 
logical reasoning in expanding on the possibility of Pakistani bombs ending up in 
terrorist hands is lost on Pakistani leadership.120 Their three conflicts with India, Pakistani 
leadership posit and not without merit, that they can secure their nuclear weapons even 
during conflict and can handle them with gravitas.  
Thus Etzioni’s FMCT pre-dating disarmament regimes is most likely infeasible. 
Instead, the FMCT treaty should be pursued conjointly to disarmament treaties, as an 
additional and alternative method of securing nuclear material and limiting non-state 
actor acquisition, all the while working on a state-level solution to proliferation through a 
nuclear weapons convention. The key aspect of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would 
                                                   






be its effects on states’ nuclear arsenals: with the cessation of fissile material production, 
no new warheads could be built. 
The second treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, better known by its 
acronym, CTBT, should be signed by the US and ratified by other states as quickly as 
possible. This treaty, building on previous testing bans such as the Partial Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty of 1963, bans testing of nuclear weapons in it  entirety. The treaty would 
serve as a huge boon for the non-proliferation regim , as nuclear weapons’ deterrence 
capabilities mostly rest on physical evidence through tests. Although the French have 
used a computer model that simulates yield, the psychological deterrent factor of pictures 
of a mushroom cloud would in effect be discredited. In much the same way, as explored 
previously, untested biological and chemical weapons also have a limited deterrent effect, 
with regards to the general public. All nuclear tests serve as examples that despite their 
costs, they add value to deterrence. The CTBT, and its verification organization, the 
CTBTO, would be a milestone on limiting the deterrenc  capabilities of nuclear weapons 
and be a major step forward towards a world without nuclear weapons. Thus those 44 
states who have currently not signed and the other w o have not ratified must follow suit 
in this enterprise. Both of these treaties are key on the road to zero and must happen 
during the initial stages.  
 
Post-Cold War Generation and Safety in Small Numbers 
Today’s security environment is characterized by the realities of a post-Cold War 





Russian arsenals, which still account for 95% of nuclear forces. As advocated by the 
“Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse” in their op-ed piece, Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, 
William Perry and George Shultz call on US-Russian co-operation in reducing their 
stockpile. 121 As Levi and O’Hanlon state: “another round of informal cuts makes sense. 
Even nuclear superpower arsenals of 1,000 warheads each […] would preserve many 
hypothetical response options beyond city-busting.”122 In a bipolar world, their nuclear 
weapons policies and Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, unorthodoxly made sense 
and aided in a more secure superpower relationship. With the end of the Cold War, 
marked by the joint statement by then Soviet Premier Gorbachev and former US 
President Ronald Reagan at the Malta Conference, these numbers are no longer needed. 
Arms control regimens that were in effect first to limit the spread and later to decrease the 
number of nuclear weapons should continue. Continuing in the path of SALT I, SALT II, 
START I, and now New START, the post-Cold War Generations’ ultimate goal should 
be to limit these two former nuclear superpowers to engage in further reductions, 
“removal of massive attack scenarios from strategic plans,”123 and even consider ban on 
tactical nuclear nukes (as suggested by the CSIS Nuclear Strategy Group124 and in a more 
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detailed form, by Global Zero’s NATO-Russia Commission Report). 125 Some previous 
strategic thinkers’ recommendations, in particular Bundy et al.’s policy 
recommendations126 of 1,500 nuclear warheads on Russian and US side hav  actually 
realized with the New START treaty limiting the number of warheads to 1,550 each.127 
Achieving that and dealing with the end of the Cold War is the only challenge 
they can face in the time allotted. The number 1,000 has to be backed by strategic 
thinking, as is the case presented by Daalder and Lodal,128 who accurately sum up the 
reasons behind it: that the existential threat to the US from the Soviet Union has 
dissolved and fewer numbers of weapons are needed for deterrence than for war 
fighting.129 This number, designate 1,000, has two separate goals: the direct one is 
reducing the number of nuclear weapons available per se, but the other, indirect and 
equally important role, is having nuclear weapon equilibrium enter into US and Russian 
policy makers though processes by demystifying the “nuclear superpower” concept. 
While it will not achieve it, the number will be sufficiently small that other nuclear 
weapons powers will want to achieve the same level to gain equal footing and weight in 
the international community. This step would also further reinforce the major two’s 
commitment towards a complete nuclear disarmament as put forth by Bridgman and the 
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Union of Concerned Scientists130. Global Zero’s Action Plan also calls for this next step, 
and their calls have not gone unheeded with pieces being published in The Economist131 
and other influential newspapers, such as the New York Times.132 Yet the full potential of 
equality between nuclear weapons states is left to the next generation.  
Thus the post-Cold War generation must and can focus n achieving the next step, 
1,000 nuclear weapons by Russian and US nuclear forces. Janne Nolan points out that 
US-Russian co-operation is key to the non-proliferation regime. She states that: “the two 
sides should seek to open more specific talks on means to maintain a stable US-Russian 
partnership as part of a move to smaller and safer nuclear forces.”133 The non-
proliferation regime must capitalize on the Obama administration’s nuclear weapons free 
movement. The Obama administration and the Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 are 
seminal in that they not only considers “nuclear disarmament is good security policy but 
is a well-developed statement of the argument itself.” 134 In a Foreign Policy poll, out of 
the 74 security experts polled, the largest group said that 1,000 nuclear weapons is all that 
the US should have.135 The unofficial talks of the next, follow-on START treaty, will 
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probably resume if Obama is re-elected for a second term. Thus achieving this next step 
is within the purview of the post-Cold War generation and is essential in both re-
committing nuclear powers on the road to zero and for them to realize that drawdowns 
are an effective method for increasing safety. Along this road to zero, most of the 
weapons currently deployed must be subsequently placed in reserves to strengthen the 
No-First-Use policy. While almost all states ascribe to defensive use only, nuclear 
weapons’ deterrence versus other forms of WMD have led some to reserve the right to 
use them. For the nuclear non-proliferation regime to ffectively limit nuclear weapons to 
the realm of strictly counter-nuclear deterrence, a more global ascription to No-First-Use 
is recommended as explored in China’s nuclear strategic culture, although not required in 
the early stages of the road to zero.  
 
The 1,000ers and Proliferation 
Once enough time has passed, the following generation w ll regard 1,000 as the 
‘nuclear superpower’ number (instead of the 40,000 warheads at the height of the Cold 
War). Yet this number is now within their reach. The sense that all NPT members and 
non-NPT nuclear weapons states should be equal is not far-fetched. In effect, the coming 
nuclear congestion, as detailed by Henry Sokolski, may be achieved sooner than we 
think. The following graph shows one possibility of c nverging nuclear weapons 
stockpiles, although it must be noted that even thoug  it may seem close, the 1,000 








Arguments for equal nuclear forces are less reliant on nuclear deterrence in a 
complex environment and more on the societal norm that nuclear weapons should not be 
used.  Deterrence theory, in a bi-polar nuclear world, made calculations and Schelling’s 
game theory applications feasible and traceable, with both sides understanding the limits 
and ramifications. 137 With other nuclear powers entering the regime, these strategic 
deterrent calculations would have had to be re-evaluated based on alliances and multi-
order nuclear effects. They have not been since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
PRC does not base its nuclear deterrent on a possibility to be able to maintain a stable 
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second strike capability versus a US-Russian alliance’s nuclear forces.138 Instead, 
Chinese strategic thought attempts to maintain a credible minimal deterrence and a ‘safe’ 
second strike nuclear force against “any” potential attackers, without creating a stockpile 
that is actually efficient against multiple opponents. Other states have exhibited similar 
policies, with France and UK’s so called “Moscow Option” nuclear deterrence theory. 
The concept of minimal deterrence is very much a socio-political construct and does not 
have be based on hard strategic worst-case scenario calculations. If this is the case, the 
number of nuclear weapons needed for it is variable nd can be limited if the 
international concept changes.  
Furthering the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Article VI commitment, Russia and US 
will have to contend that it is possible to satisfy their need for a perceived strategic 
deterrent with a force much smaller than 1,000 if the alternative is for others to build 
more. The consistent economic argument, that maintena ce and safeguarding of a nuclear 
arsenal is costly, is further reinforced by the possible strategic inefficiency of finite 
resources by maintaining a deterrent force larger than required. Thus the concept of 
minimal deterrence will have undergone its first generational conceptual shift. Other P5 
members, currently have – and for a significant amount f time maintained an equal 
number – over 200 warheads (PRC at 240, UK at 160, France with fewer than 300). 139 
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France and the UK are content with maintaining the so-called Moscow Option.140 The 
Moscow Option is an ideal example of the concept of minimal deterrence, as it posits that 
the overwhelmingly superior nuclear forces of the Soviet Union can be deterred from 
being launched against French or British national assets due to the two maintaining a 
second-strike retaliatory capability, with enough yield and missiles to ‘take out’ Moscow. 
This concept works particularly well against the Russian psyche, as their understanding 
of the Motherland is very much united around two cities: Moscow and St. Petersburg, 
both historically not just the capitals of the country, but the ideological and psychological 
embodiments of Russian rationale. Thus this stage ends when all nuclear weapon states 
consider themselves equal and set their nuclear strategic reserves at equal numbers. This 
thesis posits that at 200 nuclear warheads and only mu tilateral talks with all nuclear 
weapons states can lead to it.  
The road to zero is important as well. Not necessarily concurrently to achieving a 
“new” minimal deterrence, which, with current nuclear weapons stockpiles, can be said 
to happen at 200 nuclear warheads, the road of nuclear drawdowns has to be politicized 
as a tool for nonproliferation. The  
“basic principle is that, in reducing existing nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable 
delivery systems, we include steps for preventing their further spread. Currently, 
the connection between reducing nuclear arms and preventing their spread is 
mostly symbolic.”141  
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This has to be the case and the path to zero must be advocated adamantly. Nuclear 
weapon states must continuously apply sanctions to those wishing to join the nuclear club 
all the while consistently re-affirming their commit ent to the disarmament clause of the 
NPT. This part is to be maintained all throughout the road to zero as it is crucial for 
limiting further entries which would, as outlined above, exacerbate the current security 
environment.  
 
The 200s Club and De-Alerting 
Once socio-political realities have adjusted to nuclear weapons being equally 
distributed, the nuclear weapon states can continue down the road to zero.  The smaller 
the number of nuclear warheads, the easier it is to maintain supervision and appropriate 
safeguards measures. Also, inasmuch as deterrence works, the cost of it can also be 
‘controlled’. Resources spent on maintaining a larger deterrent force than needed are 
resources wasted – alternate methods would increase strat gic efficiency for states to 
fulfill their other obligations towards their population. Security is just one. By this point, 
the NPT and the non-proliferation regime must be sufficiently strengthened to be able to 
keep members inside. The exit clause must be rescinded and those not signatories must 
be kept under constant economic sanctions to participa e. Finally, this step is also 
characterized by de-alerting. 
Concurrently to nuclear drawdowns, but by this point necessarily, nuclear 





and their possible us. Potential nuclear accidents are one of the reasons to do so. Bruce 
Blair et al. aptly summarize it: 
“That frightening incident [the 1995 Norwegian missile launch] (like some 
previous false alarms that activated U.S. strategic forces) aptly demonstrates the 
danger of maintaining nuclear arsenals in a state of hair-trigger alert. Doing so 
heightens the possibility that one day someone will mistakenly launch nuclear-
tipped missiles, either because of a technical failure or a human error--a mistake 
made, perhaps, in the rush to respond to false indications of an attack.”142 
 
They go on to outline how the post-Cold War nuclear gacy is still engrained within the 
strategic culture of the policy makers of today.  
“So within just a few minutes of receiving instructions to fire, a large fraction of 
the U.S. and Russian land-based rockets (which are arm d with about 2,000 and 
3,500 warheads, respectively) could begin their 25-minute flights over the North 
Pole to their wartime targets. Less than 15 minutes after receiving the order to 
attack, six U.S. Trident submarines at sea could loft roughly 1,000 warheads, and 
several Russian ballistic-missile submarines could dispatch between 300 and 400. 
In sum, the two nuclear superpowers remain ready to fire a total of more than 
5,000 nuclear weapons at each other within half an hour.”143  
  
This strategic culture of the past can and should be changed. With the US-led 
Western World and the USSR-led Socialist world no longer set as enemies on a path 
necessarily leading to conflict, de-alerting is a logical step both to limit potential 
accidents and to induce further trust. By the time the international security environment 
has gone from two major nuclear superpowers to this international club of 200s, the 
probability of nuclear weapons use should be even more diminished. No-First-Use 
policies and FMCT and CTBT ratifications should further reinforce this concept of 
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nuclear weapons as a relic of stability of the past. While some would argue that a “fully 
de-alerted force would weaken deterrence against third parties, such as rogue states,”144 
inasmuch as this is concerned, immediate retaliation is not necessary for deterrence, only 
certain retaliation is, as put forth by Feiveson in The Nuclear Tipping Point.  De-alerting 
steps must also be approached the same way the road to zero: combining strategic 
perceived reality with normative values, as beneficial for humanity. Bruce Blair outlines 
the necessary steps: step one, eliminate massive attack options and launch-on-warning 
status from nuclear repertoires; step two, implement physical steps that add lead time to 
launches; step three, warheads and delivery vehicles would be separated but kept in 
proximity, and finally, in step four, delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads would be 
stored in separate locations.145  
 Inasmuch as specific de-alerting steps are concerned, Dr. Blair’s argument is only 
valid for current nuclear arsenals – those of the future might have different specifications. 
Yet the concept remains essentially the same. Some would even argue that hair-trigger 
alert is illegal under the International Court of Justice’s prohibition of use of force that 
would inflict indiscriminate harm, unnecessary suffering, and disproportionate damage to 
the environment.146 By increasing the time needed significantly for launching a nuclear 
warhead, the proverbial “sword of Damocles” hanging over humanity’s head would be 
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moved further off. For societies not having to live under the fear that any moment the 
decision could be made that global thermonuclear war become a reality would increase 
their safety significantly. This step is crucial to be achieved for the next stage to be able 
to set in. De-alerted nuclear forces, while still offering perceived deterrence, further 
remove their potential use from societies.  
 
Asymptotic Minimal Deterrence and Verification 
This penultimate stage is characterized by the drawown of nuclear weapons to an 
even lower number, with multi-national talks. Once th number 200 seems as out-dated 
and as illogical as 40,000, the nuclear deterrent neded can be further reduced, to an even 
smaller number. McGeorge Bundy would posit, and this work agrees with it, is that 
nuclear weapons should and are only used to deter oth nuclear attacks – the PRCs case 
shows that this in fact is feasible. Bundy states in The Use of Force that  
“I think, that these weapons [nuclear] have not been of great use to any 
governments for such wider purposes [non-nuclear deterrence], and I also think 
that misreading of that record has led to grossly mistaken and to unnecessary, 
costly, and sometimes dangerous deployments.”147  
 
Thus the logical conclusion, as supported by historical precedents, posits that 
stable nuclear relations exhibit similarly sized nuclear forces. While in this stage, the 
number will not be zero, but a vertical asymptote will be reached, with the number of 
nuclear weapons still in states’ arsenals limited by safeguards and economic arguments. 
The cost of maintaining nuclear weapons, as made explicit by the Brookings Institution 
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nuclear study, is extremely high. The cost of all nuclear weapons programs for the US 
alone until 1998 is estimated to be $35,100,000,000.148 By 2009, this number is at least at 
52 billion US dollars. Choubey and Schwartz estimate that "only 1.3 percent ($700 
million) of the nuclear security budget was devoted to preparing for the consequences of 
a nuclear or radiological attack. Another 56 percent of the total went toward operating, 
sustaining, and upgrading the U.S. nuclear arsenal."149 The authors also argue that  
"Nuclear security consumes $13 billion more than inter ational diplomacy and 
foreign assistance; nearly double what the United States allots for general science, 
space, and technology; and 14 times what the Department of Energy (DOE) 
budgets for all energy-related research and development."150  
 
Global Zero capitalizes on this cost and puts it into more readily comprehensible 
terms by stating that one missile costs 400 scholarships. Yet as economic and other 
arguments outlined above draw these numbers further and further down, verification of 
international treaties and implementations thereof will become increasingly important. 
Kalinowski would claim that the number of deployed nuclear weapons can be drawn 
down to 10-20 if similar steps are met (although his t eories, presented in 2000, have not 
seen the prerequisites fulfilled and as such, the timing is off).151 
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 Almost all current nuclear weapons abolition movements call for short-term 
nuclear eliminations and world-wide implementation and verification regimes. Yet as 
O’Hanlon clearly states, not only are current sensors unable to scan large amounts of 
territory for nuclear weapons152. Furthermore, this technology is not yet on the horizon.153 
The technological argument that it will not become possible to reliably monitor all 
nuclear materials in the next few decades is a major strike against the nuclear abolitionist 
cause.154 Thus the problem cannot be solved in the near futue – but by the time the 
previous stages have been completed, more than a few decades would have passed. 
Computing power has doubled according to Moore’s Law in the last decades and will do 
so in the near future – thus it is safe to assume that the possibility of future systems being 
able to verify internationally such implementation regimes will be a reality in the future, 
even if not the near future. Universal verification at this point is instrumental to the non-
proliferation regime, both to deter nuclear capable states from seeking break-out options 
and for nuclear weapons states to hide warheads.  
 Whether a new treaty is needed to accomplish this or the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty suffices, is more a matter of semantics than actual strategic 
considerations. The NPT can be amended to include the new requirements for global 
zero, or Jurgen Schefran calls for, a new Nuclear Weapons Convention can be negotiated, 
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to include international verification and implementation procedures. 155 Multiple authors 
call for robust verification systems to be in place (former UN High Representative for 
Disarmament, Duarte Sergio, and former IAEA Director General Muhammed ElBaradei, 
are two high level politicians who do so). The details of such a verification and 
implementation regime are technical and beyond the scope of this paper, but as previous 
arms control treaties, if backed by political will, have proved successful. One other 
weakness of the NPT is the withdrawal clause. North Korea has successfully used this 
clause to leave the treaty and as such, has successfully avoided IAEA and international 
supervision of the DPRKs nuclear program. Thus either e NPT or this new NWC must 
have a non-withdrawal clause, or as Rotblat et al. cl im, no provisions for withdrawal 
from the treaty and severe repercussions for attemping to do so. 156 
  
Trust Fund Kids  
 This last stage is the process by which asymptotic deterrence is furthered to global 
zero, where no warheads remain operational, and, after having been de-alerted, are stored 
away from their delivery systems. The “Trust Fund Ki s”, who will see the work and 
effort of their predecessors mature in their generation, will have the option of finalizing 
this step. After they secure the needed implementatio  nd finalize the verification of the 
nuclear weapons system, they will be presented with the option of eliminating the 
weapons themselves from reserve forces as well.  By this time, nuclear forces can be 
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considered to have been de-operationalized, not as a form of deterrence, but as a form of 
“national insurance.”157 The non-proliferation regime must focus on stating hat a de-
operationalized nuclear arsenal is not a source of threat for any members of the 
international community. The technology and blueprints of nuclear weapons, bar a global 
catastrophe, will not be forgotten. If nuclear weapons still remain humanities best defense 
against extra-terrestrial objects, and remains as the best alternative for planetary defense, 
then a contingent of nuclear weapons must be placed within an international supervisory 
body’s hands.158 These weapons will also be de-operationalized and kept at a minimum. 
This generation will have the option of finalizing global zero by upping the sanctions 
already in place and internationally delegitimizing even the start of a process of nuclear 
weapon re-installment.   
 
The World without Nuclear Weapons 
As Victor Gilinsky so aptly summarizes our current thinking: “We sometimes 
contemplate the possibility of a worldwide nuclear breakdown, but I think we do so only 
on an intellectual level. We do not really believe it can happen. If we did, we would 
behave differently.”159 No one would believe that a nuclear explosion right now would be 
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a ‘good thing’, yet it would most likely further the cause of global zero along.160 Whether 
a catastrophe is needed for the international community to act on this matter remains to 
be seen. As outlined above, the problems with nuclear weapons do no present themselves 
to be solved overnight. Even if the will was there by all participants, trust can only be 
built through long-term confidence building measure and time. This way to global zero 
attempted to show that for this trust to develop to adequately deal with the threat of 
nuclear weapons, multiple decades are needed. By a slow process, the risk of 
miscalculation is highly reduced and the potential for cooperation is greatly increased. 
The following  figure shows a model for the interstate relations that would happen if 
proliferation continues and those states who are nuclear capable in fact acquire them in 
the near future.  
                                                   






With the number of potential conflict areas exponentially increasing, the threat of 
cataclysm rises. The only way to combat proliferation effectively is embark on the path to 
zero. The rationale, even with its constraints, is a worthy one, and the path outlined above 
has the potential to minimize the strategic risks involved while building on a normative 
reality that, upon entrance into public consciousnes , will increase security for all 
involved. Through these stages outlined above, the non-proliferation regime can embark 
on the road to zero all the while satisfying security risks inherent to each stage. While 
considerable resources must be spent to keep the verification regime operational, the end 
state is a safer and more secure global environment.   
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Barring a global catastrophe on the scale of the Dark Ages, the international 
community will not forget the technology and blueprints of nuclear weapons.  If the 
world sees the invention of weapons that are more destructive than nuclear weapons, the 
situation shifts dramatically, perhaps to the point that talking about nuclear weapons will 
no longer be relevant.  The Trust Fund Kids generation will have the option of finalizing 
global zero by internationally delegitimizing the start of a process of nuclear weapon re-
installment.  Building on the past generations’ efforts, the Trust Fund Kids will ultimately 
be able to decide what to do with their legacy.  Whether they will spend the resources to 
maintain the international regime or let the efforts of their predecessors go to waste and 
engage in a new nuclear arms race is ultimately their decision.  Without question, the 










2010 Nuclear Posture Review, US Department of Defense, URL: 
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf 
 
2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/ 
 
“A Nuclear Peace: The Future of Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy”, 
CSIS Nuclear Strategy Group, June 1993. 
 
Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Philip. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. Longman, New York, 1999. 
   
Barnett, Thomas. The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century. 
Putnam’s Sons, New York, 2004.  
 
Bates, Gill. “Two Steps Forward, One Step  Back: The Dynamics of Chinese 
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Policy-making in a Era of Reform” in Lampton, 
David M. (ed) The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 
Stanford, Stanford, 2001.  
 
Blair, Bruce G., Feiveson, Harold, and von Hippel, Frank N. “Who's Got the Button? 
Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert”, Scientific America, November 1997, 
from Center for Defense Information website, URL: 
http://www.cdi.org/aboutcdi/SciAmerBB.html, accessed April 1, 2012.  
 
Blair, Bruce. “Increasing Warning and Decision Time”. Paper presented at International 
Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, Oslo, Norway, February 2008.  
 
Blunn, Elaine M. (ed) “The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” in Global 
Strategic Assessment 2009, from National Defense University website, URL:  
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/02-GSA2009 
 
Bridgman, Jim, et al. “Toward Nuclear Sanity”, Unio f Concerned Scientists, April 
2003. 
 
Bundy, McGeorge. “The Unimpressive Record of Atomic D plomacy” in Waltz, Kenneth 
A. and Art, Robert J. (eds) The Use of Force, Rowman, Lanham, 2004.  
 
Bundy, McGeorge, William J Crowe, Drell, Sidney D. Reducing Nuclear Danger: The 






Bunn, George and Rhinelander, John B. ‘‘Looking Back: The Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty, Then and Now,’’ Arms Control Today 38 (July/August 08), 
www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-08/, accessed May 15th, 2011.  
 




Byrne, Michael, Edson, Douglas and Hlosek, Andrea. “A Nuclear Weapons Free 
NATO”. University of North Carolina: American Diplomacy Online., 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0406/comm/byrneetal_natonuke.html#_ed
n14, accessed May 22nd, 2011. 
 
Campbell, Kurt M., and Einhorn, Robert J. “Concluding Observations” in Campbell, Kurt 
M., Einhorn, Robert J., and Reiss, Mitchell B. (eds) The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why 
States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. Brookings, Washington DC, 2004.,  
 
Carter, Ashton B. “How to Counter WMD”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2004.  
 
Carus, Seth W. “Defining ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’”, Center for the Study of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Occasional Paper, January 2006.  
 
Charter of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml,  
 
China's National Defense in 2006,” issued by the Information Office of the State 
Council People's Republic of China, 29 December, 2006 
 
“China refuses to back down on general’s nuclear threat over Taiwan”, Agence France 
Presse, July 16th, 2005. Taken from Space War website reporting AFP article, URL: 
http://www.spacewar.com/news/nuclear-doctrine-05zm.ht l  
 
Cirincione, Joseph. “Arms Control’s New Movement”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 
July-August 2007. 
 
Cirincione, Joseph, Wolfsthal, Jon. B, and Rajkumar, Mi iam. Deadly Arsenals: Tracking 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Brookings Institute Press, Washington, 2002. 
 
Colby, Elbridge. “Nuclear Abolition: A Dangerous Illusion”, Orbis 52, No. 3., 2008.  
 







Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives, Directions des 
applications militaires. URL: http://www-dam.cea.fr/dynamique/accueil/accueil.asp, 
accessed November 1st, 2011. 
 
Commission for Conventional Armaments, UN document S/C.3/32/Rev.1, August 1948, 
as quoted in United Nations, Office of Public Information, The United Nations and 
Disarmament, 1945–1965, UN Publication 67.I.8, 28. 
 
 “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction”, text from the 




Countdown to Zero. Dir. Lucy Walker. Magnolia Pictures, 2010. Film.  
 
CSIS Nuclear Strategy Group. “A Nuclear Peace: The Future of Nuclear Weapons in 
U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy”, June 1993. 
 
Daalder, Ivo, and Lodal, Jan. “The Logic of Zero: Tward a World Without Nuclear 
Weapons”. Foreign Affairs, November-December 2008. 
 
“Defense Industrial Department Carries Forward Two-Bombs, One-Satellite Spirit”, 
news report of People’s Daily, Beijing, April 26, 2000. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200004/26_39766.html. 
   
Dunn, Lewis A. THE NPT: Assessing the Past, Building the Future. Nonproliferation 
Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009. 
 
Elbridge, Colby. “Nuclear Abolition: A Dangerous Illusion”., Orbis 52., No. 3., 2008.  
 
“Emerging WMD Technologies and the U.S. Air Force,” Air Force Emerging Issues 
Project, December 2004.  
 
Etzioni, Amitai. “Deproliferation: An approach to preventing nuclear terrorism”, The 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 23, 2008. 
 
Falk, Richard, and Krieger, David (eds). At the Nuclear Precipice: Catastrophe or 
Transformation?” Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008.  
 
Fergusson, James. Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1954-2009: Déjà  Vu 
All Over Again. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press,  2010. 
   






French White Paper on Defence and National Security, June 2008, from Council on 
Foreign Relations, URL: http://www.cfr.org/france/french-white-paper-defenc-national-
security/p16615, accessed November 5th, 2011. 
 
Gilinsky, Victor. “How Will the Nuclear Story End?”. In Sokolski, Henry (ed)., The 
NPT’s Potential to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation 
 
Gill, Bates. Rising Star: China’s New Security Strategy. Brookings, Washington, 2007. 
 
Global Zero Movement. www.globalzero.org  
 
Global Zero NATO-Russia Commission Report Findings, URL: 
http://www.globalzero.org/en/nato-russia-commission-report 
 
Goldblat, Jozef. Nuclear Disarmament: Obstacles to Banishing the Bomb. St. Martin’s 
Press, New York, 2000.  
 
Goldstein, Joshua. Winning the War on War. Penguin, New York, 2011.  
 
Griffith, Lewis, and Campbell, Edwina. “Obama and the Path to Zero: Thrust and Vector 
versus Speed and Distance”, working paper.  
 
Guillemin, Jeanne. Biological Weapons. Columbia, New York, 2005.  
 
Hagerty, Devin. “The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation”,  in Waltz, Kenneth, and 
Sagan, Scott. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Norton, New York, 2003.  
 
Harigel, Gert G. “Introduction to Chemical and Biological Weapons—Chemical and 
Biological Weapons: Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and Environment,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2001, URL: 
www.ceip.org/files/Publications/Harigelreport. asp?p=8&from=pubauthor 
     
 “How to Build a Nuclear Bomb”, speech given by Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy at the 2011 
Global Zero Convention, Washington, DC, George Washington University’s Eliot School 
of International Affairs. 
 
Hymans, Jacques E.C. The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and 
Foreign Policy. Cambridge, Cambridge, 2006. 
 
“JFK on Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation”, Carnegie Endowment for 







Kahn, Herman. Thinking about the Unthinkable in the 1980’s. Simon and Schuster, New 
York, 1984.  
 
Kalinowski, Martin (ed)., Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Nomos, Baden 
Baden, 2000.  
 
Kristensen, Hans M. “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American 
Scientists, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nukestatus.html, accessed on 18 
March 2009. 
 
Larsen Jeffrey, and Wirtz, James. Arms Control and Cooperative Security. Lynne Rieder, 
Boulder, 2009.   
 
“Layered Defenses: The Defense Threat Reduction Agency ngages in international 
partners in the fight against WMD.” published in Agora, “Weapons of Mass 
Destruction”, Volume 4, No.1 2011. 
 
Levi, Michael A., and O’Hanlon, Michael E., The Future of Arms Control, Brookings 
Institute Press, Washington, 2005. 
 
Lieber, Keir A.,  and Press, Daryl G. “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. 
Primacy”. International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4 
 
MacDougal, Walter A. Promised Land, Crusader State: Th  American Encounter with the 
World Since 1776. Houghton Wifflin, New York, 1997. 
 
Mazarr, Michael J., and Lennon, Alexander T. (eds)., Toward a Nuclear Peace: The 
Future of Nuclear Weapons. New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2004.  
 
NATO New Strategic Concept, Active Engagement, Modern Defence. 
http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf  
 




Nolan, Janne E. An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security After 
the Cold War. Brookings, Washington, 1999.  
 
Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen. "French Nuclear Forces, 2008."  Nuclear 
Notebook, Natural Resources Defense Council, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 64 






North Atlantic Treaty, The Atlantic Charter. Article 3. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-
4D81FEC4-F22C6136/natolive/official_texts.html 
 
“Nuclear disarmament: France's practical commitment,” Working paper submitted by 
France to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 14 April 2010, URL: 
www.reachingcriticalwill.org, accessed November 2, 2011. 
 
“Nuclear endgame: The growing appeal of zero,” The Economist Online, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18836134, accessed November 13, 2011.  
 
Nuclear France: Materials and Sites, Mary Byrd Davis, Yggdrasil Institute, URL:  
http://www.francenuc.org/en_chn/nucwarheads_e.htm, accessed November 2nd, 2011. 
 
“The Nuclear ‘Implementation Study’”, New York Times Online, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/opinion/the-nuclear-implementation-
study.html?_r=1, accessed April 22, 2012.  
 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, text from the United Nations Review Conference 
website, URL: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/npttext.shtml, accessed March 25, 
2012.  
 
Nuclear Posture Review, US Department of Defense, January 9, 2002. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/do/npr.htm 
    
Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Nuclear Profile: China,  URL: 
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/ accessed November 2, 2011.   
 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Nuclear Profile: France, URL: 
http://www.nti.org/db/disarmament/country_france.html, accessed November 2, 2011.   
 
“Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What At a Glance”, Arms Control Association, URL: 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat 
 
O’Hanlon, Michael. Technological Change and the Future of Warfare, Brookings, 
Washington DC, 2000. 
 




Payne, Keith B. “On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance.”  Air Force Strategic Studies 
Quarterly, Spring 2009, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/payne.pdf, accessed 






Potter, William C., and Mukhatzhanova, Gaukhar. Divining Nuclear Intentions A Review 
Essay. 
International Security, Volume 33, Number 1, Summer 2008, pp. 139-169  
 
“Preparing for Planetary Defense: Detection and Interception of Asteroids on Collision 
Course with Earth”, Air University Spacecast 2020: Into the Future, URL: 
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usaf/2020/app-r.html  
 
President Barack Obama, speech delivered in Prague, Czech Republic, on April 5th, 2009. 
www.huffingtonpost.com/.../obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219.html 
 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism,” issued on 
June 21, 1995. 
 
Private Conversations with Bruce Blair at first Global Zero Convention, Washington, 
DC, May 2011.  
 
“Proposal on Essential Measures for an Immediate Halt to the Arms Race and for 
Disarmament”, Working Paper submitted by the Chinese Delegation at the Second 
Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, June 21, 1982. 
http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/ch0682.html 
 
Payne, Keith B. “On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance.”  Air Force Strategic Studies 
Quarterly, Spring 2009, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/payne.pdf, accessed 
May 16, 2011. 
 
Potter, William C., and Mukhatzhanova, Gaukhar. “Divining Nuclear Intentions A 
Review Essay.”International Security, Volume 33, Number 1, Summer 2008,  
 
Private conversation with Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy during Global Zero Conference, 
Washington, DC, May 2011.  
 
Public Papers of the President, 1963-4, 2:1051, taken from Waltz, Kenneth A. and Art, 
Robert J. The Use of Force, Rowman, Lanham, 2004. 
 
Reiss, Mitchell B. “The Nuclear Tipping Point” in Campbell, Kurt M., Einhorn, Robert 
J., and Reiss, Mitchell B. (eds) The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Thir 
Nuclear Choices. Brookings, Washington DC, 2004. 
 
Rotblat, Joseph, Steinberger, Jack, Udgaonkar, Bhalchandra, and Blackaby, Frank (eds)., 
A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Desirable? Feasible? Westview, Boulder, 1993.  
 
Sagan, Scott. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a 






Sagan, Scott, and Waltz, Kenneth. T e Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Norton, New York, 
2003.  
 
Schefran, Jurgen, Falk, Richard, and Krieger, David, (e s.), At the Nuclear Precipice: 
Catastrophe or Transformation. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.  
 
Schelling, Thomas, and Halperin, Morton. Strategy and Arms Control. Twentieth 
Century, New York, 1961.  
 
Schelling, Thomas. The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 
1980.  
 
Schmitt, Eric, and Shanker, Thom. Counterstrike. Henry Holt, New York, 2011 
 
Schultz, George., Perry, William J., Kissinger, Henry A., and Nunn, Sam. “Toward a 
Nuclear Free World,” The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, taken from Nuclear 
Threat Initiative website, http://www.nti.org/analysis/opinions/toward-nuclear-free-
world/, accessed November 13, 2012.  
 
“Schwartz, Stephen.  “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project”, taken from Brookings 
Institute “50 Facts About Nuclear Weapons”, URL: 
http://www.brookings.edu/projects/archive/nucweapons/50.aspx 
 
Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, October 3, 2007. 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t369084.htm. 
 
Shavit, Ari. “The Bomb and the Bomber.” New York Times Online, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/opinion/the-bomb-and-the-bomber.html?_r=2, 
accessed April 11th, 2012.    
 
Sloan, Stanley R. NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community. Rowman and 
Littlefield, Lanham, 2003.  
 
Sokolski, Henry. “Moving Toward Zero and Armageddon”, i  Sokolski, Henry (ed)., The 
NPT’s Potential to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation 
 
Solingen, Etel. Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East. 
Princeton, Princeton, 2007.  
 
Spector, Leonard S., “The Future of the Non-Proliferation Regime” in Larsen, Jeffrey, 
and Wirtz, James A (eds)., Arms Control and Cooperative Security, Lynne Rienner, 






Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, October 16, 1964., taken 
from Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/nucsta64.htm 
 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 2011. URL: 
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011/07, accessed November 1, 2011.  
 
Tannenwald, Nina. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-use of Nuclear 
Weapons since 1945. Cambridge, Cambridge, 2007.  
  
The 9/11 Commission’s Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States. Norton, New York, 2004.   
 
 “The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy”, Committee on International Security and 
Arms Control, from The Arms Control Association, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_05/nas, ccessed April 22, 2012.    
 
“The Legal Case for De-Alerting Nuclear Weapons”, The Lawyers Committee on 
Nuclear Policy, URL: http://lcnp.org/disarmament/dealerting.htm, accessed April 1, 
2012.  
  
“The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, i  Global Strategic Assessment 
2009, Institute for National Strategic Studies  
 
United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, DFMI, Military and 
Strategic Studies Course, Weapons of Mass Effect (tn a ive title), forthcoming.  
 
United State Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. URL: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16281.htm, accessed November 2, 2011. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth A. and Art, Robert J. (eds) The Use of Force, Rowman, Lanham, 2004 
 
Waltz, Kenneth, and Sagan, Scott. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Norton, New York, 
2003.,  
 
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars. Basic, New York, 2006. 
 
Yuan, Jing-Dong. “China’s Pragmatic Approach to Non-proliferation Policy in the Post-
Cold War Era” in Zhao, Suisheng (ed.), Chinese Foreign Policy, East Gate, Armonk, NY, 
2004 
 
 
 
